Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses

CMC Student Scholarship

2011

Changing Incentives: How Electoral Reform Can
Help Remove an Ethnic Focus in Political
Competitions in Kenya
Carliann Brashier
Claremont McKenna College

Recommended Citation
Brashier, Carliann, "Changing Incentives: How Electoral Reform Can Help Remove an Ethnic Focus in Political Competitions in
Kenya" (2011). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 186.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/186

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE
CHANGING INCENTIVES: HOW ELECTORAL REFORM CAN HELP
REMOVE AN ETHNIC FOCUS IN POLITICAL COMPETITIONS IN KENYA

SUBMITTED TO
PROFESSOR EDWARD HALEY
AND
DEAN GREGORY HESS
BY
CARLIANN BRASHIER

FOR
SENIOR THESIS
SPRING 2011
APRIL 25, 2011

“As a writer once put it, we feel more at ease discussing other people’s tribalism
and not our own. And that is the problem in Kenya today.”
-Walter O. Oyugi

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my reader and advisor, Professor Haley, for pushing me in
my writing these past four years. This thesis would not have been possible without his
support to pursue my interests in East Africa. I would like to thank my mother for her
never ending encouragement and countless hours reading through my work. Only a
mother would have the patience to read a ninety page paper numerous times. Finally, I
would like to thank my friends for reminding me to laugh on a daily basis. I have learned
a great deal these past four years but none of it would matter if I did not have my friends
by my side to help me enjoy the process along the way.

Table of Contents
Acronyms .................................................................................................................. 1
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 2
Chapter 1: First-Past-The-Post ................................................................................. 22
Section A- Colonialism: Majimboism and Land ........................................... 22
Section B- Zero-Sum Mentality.................................................................... 26
Section C- Reform Options .......................................................................... 27
Parliamentary Electoral Reform Options ........................................... 28
Presidential Electoral Reform Options .............................................. 30
Section D- Recommendations ...................................................................... 31
Parliamentary Electoral Reform Recommendations .......................... 32
Presidential Electoral Reform Recommendations.............................. 36
Chapter 2: Political Parties and Campaigning .......................................................... 37
Section A- Independence and Post-Colonialism ........................................... 39
Parties for Independence ................................................................... 39
The Emergence of Political Coalitions .............................................. 42
The Institutionalized Fear and Ethnicity............................................ 44
Section B- Kenya against the Kikuyu ........................................................... 45
Ethnic Campaigning ......................................................................... 45
Code of Conduct............................................................................... 50
Section C- Reform Options .......................................................................... 52
Inciting Division ............................................................................... 54
Institutional Enforcement ................................................................. 55

Section D- Recommendations ...................................................................... 56
Inciting Division ............................................................................... 57
Institutional Enforcement ................................................................. 59
Changing the Incentives System: Common Interests ......................... 60
Chapter 3: The Electoral Commission of Kenya ...................................................... 62
Section A- ECK and the Constitution ........................................................... 63
Section B- The Election: Where Was the ECK? ........................................... 65
Section C- Reform Options .......................................................................... 70
Institutional Independence ................................................................ 70
Management and Implementation ..................................................... 71
The Media and Information .............................................................. 74
Disputed Elections ............................................................................ 75
Section D- Recommendations ...................................................................... 76
Institutional Independence ................................................................ 77
Management and Implementation ..................................................... 80
The Media and Information .............................................................. 84
Disputed Elections ............................................................................ 86
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 90
Appendices .............................................................................................................. 98
Bibliography.......................................................................................................... 104

1

List of Acronyms

ECK

Electoral Commission of Kenya

FPTP

First-Past-The-Post

IPPG

Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group

IREC

Independent Review Commission

KADU

Kenyan African Democratic Party

KANU

Kenyan African National Union

KBC

Kenya Broadcasting Corporation

LCD

Lesotho Congress of Democracy

LDP

Liberal Democratic Party

MCK

Media Council of Kenya

MMP

Mixed-Member Proportional Representation

MPs

Members of Parliament

NAK

National Alliance Party of Kenya

NARC

National Alliance Rainbow Coalition

NGO

Non-governmental Organizations

ODM

Orange Democratic Movement

ODM-K

Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya

PPA

Political Parties Act

PNU

Party of National Unity

PR

Proportional Representation

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

2

Introduction
Prior to the presidential elections in December 2007, Kenya was viewed as one of
the few politically stable and economically prosperous countries in Africa, a paradigm for
other African countries to emulate. At least this was the view held widely in the Western
world. Missing in this analysis were the growing ethnic tensions which, although not
new to Kenya (the precedence was established during the colonial era), had grown
increasingly volatile during the past two decades. The 2007 election results revealed
even sharper bitterness and divisions among Kenyans: “A day after President Mwai
Kibaki was declared the winner of a second term, people who have lived as neighbors for
decades in the Nairobi enclave began speaking of two Kenyas, one for the Kikuyu,
Kibaki's tribe, and one for Luos and other ethnic groups loyal to opposition leader Raila
Odinga, who says the vote was rigged.” 1 Ethnic lines were clearly delineated and the
country experienced two months of violence that left more than 1,000 people dead and
300,000 people homeless.2 Much of the period leading up to the election was politically
charged by ethnic hostilities as opposition leader Raila Odinga‟s supporters accused
incumbent Kibaki of ethnic favoritism towards his Kikuyu community. 3 It is important to
note that the Kikuyu not only constitute the largest ethnic group in Kenya, but have
dominated Kenya‟s political scene since the country gained independence from Great
Britain in 1963.4 While Kibaki and Odinga reached a tenuous power-sharing agreement
on February 28, 2008, the election left a coalition government and an elevated level of
1

Stephanie McCrummen, “Ethnic Fault Lines Emerge in Kenya‟s Post-Election Turmoil,” Washington
Post, January 1, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/12/31/AR2007123100539.html (accessed December 6, 2010).
2
Alert, Spring 2008, Vol. 11 No. 7, pg. 6.
3
“Ethnic Fault Lines.”
4
Ibid.
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concern regarding prevailing ethnic hostilities. One has to ask, would a sense of civic
nationalism have averted the riots and the subsequent human and economic fallout?
With ethnic identification increasingly becoming a polarizing force in political
competitions in Kenya, it is in the best interest of the Kenyan government to reform its
electoral policies and procedures to generate a change in incentives which promote civic
nationalism as a way to counter the negative aspects of an ethnically diverse nation.
Changes must be made in three key areas of the current electoral system:


Changing the current voting system of first-past-the-post (FPTP) to a closed list
Proportional Representation (PR) system in parliamentary elections and to a tworound system for presidential elections



Redefining and creating mechanisms for developing and enforcing better rules for
political parties and campaigning



Reforming the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) to make it the predominant
authority on electoral activities in Kenya.

Using Kenya as a case study, this thesis focuses on how electoral reform can be utilized
as one way to decrease the use of ethnicity as a political tool which currently creates
unnecessary tensions. Each chapter focuses on a different aspect of electoral reform:
chapter one looks at changing the current voting system of first-past-the-post (FPTP) to a
closed list Proportional Representation (PR) system in parliamentary elections and a tworound voting system in presidential elections, chapter two addresses redefining and
creating mechanisms for developing and enforcing better rules for political parties and
campaigning, and finally, chapter three explores reforming the Electoral Commission of
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Kenya (ECK) to make it the predominant authority on electoral activities in Kenya.
These chapters will each be divided into four sections.

Starting from a historical

perspective, the beginning of each chapter, Section A, looks at the foundation of ethnic
division in Kenya resulting from colonization based on the topic of focus. The electoral
institutions and societal mechanisms established during the post-colonial struggle for
independence are then discussed. Section B provides an analysis of how the component
being discussed in the chapter contributed to the violence of the 2007 elections. This
section details the repercussions and implications of the ethnically dominated violence
that followed. Section C presents the various reform options available. Using other
African countries as examples for successes, failures, and inspiration, this section
explores how other African states have tackled the issues that surround multi-ethnic
populations and the resulting conflicts. It also looks at the recommendations of the
Kriegler Commission which was charged with analyzing the 2007 elections and the
resultant fallout. Finally, Section D concludes each chapter by arguing for the best option
that addresses the ethnic question in regards to its politicization in the electoral process
and promotes civic nationalism over ethnically minded interests.
History has played a large part in the influence of ethnicity in African politics.
The impact has been exceptionally damaging: “owing to the extreme arbitrariness and
artificiality of colonial era territorial demarcations and manipulations in Africa, the
continent has the largest concentration of ethno-political minorities at risk in the world
followed by Eastern Europe, Asia, the Western democracies, and Latin America in that
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order.”5 The problem is amplified by the abuse of ethnic identity by African institutions
from political parties to the government itself which repress and manipulate multi-ethnic
ties instead of working towards accommodation and mediation. 6 The use of ethnicity as a
political weapon frequently takes center stage during elections because they offer an
arena for the political competition that resonates in a country. The consequences of this
use of ethnicity have global implications: “In Africa and beyond, ethnic (as well as
religious and regional) identity conflicts have hobbled the capacity and legitimacy of
governments, drained the integrity and unity of states, and ravaged the cohesion and
coherence of civil societies.”7 It is the ordinary citizen who suffers the most from these
conflicts; many of them become internally displaced persons, losing their homes, meager
means of livelihood, and often family and friends. The physical and psychological
consequences of this violence and disruption of life are not easily repaired. Political
instability as a result of ethnic hostilities not only affects citizens, but has repercussions
for neighboring countries which often have to assume responsibility for fleeing refugees,
deal the fallout from sheltering rebels, and can take an economic hit if they lose a trading
partner. Globally, the rest of the world has to bear the responsibility for humanitarian
relief as war torn countries face famine, disease, death, and the weight of internally
displaced persons on large scales. The devastation of the events that followed the
Kenyan 2007 elections magnified these issues and placed them on the front pages of
newspapers worldwide.

5

Goran Hyden and others, eds. African Perspectives on Governance, (Eritrea: Africa World Press, 2000),
130.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., 123.
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Elections have been seen as the cornerstone for countries striving to become (or at
least appear more) “democratic.” Kenya is one of the many countries in Africa that has
chosen to use elections as a means of selecting its leaders and members of government.
This paper is not arguing for democracy in Kenya. Rather, it is looking at an electoral
system that has already been chosen and put in place. It is not seeking to argue for „free
and fair‟ elections but to address the ethnic component that is so prevalent in the process.
The recommended reforms to the electoral system that are discussed throughout the paper
regarding ethnicity will, however, likely cover some of the issues that fall under „free and
fair.‟ Furthermore, it is not looking at regime change. The ultimate focus is on how
ethnicity is used as a political tool and what steps can be taken to change this negative
use and works towards a sense of national unity. As a case study, Kenya exposes the
realities of ethnic divisions in Africa and demonstrates the need for African institutions at
all levels to address the abuse of ethnic identities in political competition. Suzanne
Mueller argues the 2007 elections brought to light some of the shortcomings not only of
Kenya‟s electoral system, but political competition as a whole:
Kenyan political institutions have been subject to the power of a highly
centralized and personalized presidency; that political parties have been
driven by the desire of politicians to acquire access to state resources and
patronage; that these political parties have focused overwhelmingly upon
the necessity of winning; and that, as a result, elections in Kenya have
become a „do or die zero-sum‟ exercise in which politicians have resorted
both to appeals to ethnicity and the use of violence against opponents. In
turn, while neither political parties nor voters regard the Electoral
Commission and the wider state administrative system as neutral, voters
themselves are widely induced to vote along ethnic lines, not least because

7

of the fear of violence or „ethnic others‟ gaining advantage over their own
communities. 8

These issues are encapsulated by one problem: the incentives in the current competitive
political system are skewed by both politicians and voters alike. The existing and
dominate incentive is to gain or maintain power by whatever means necessary; hence the
reliance on ethnicity for patronage and even violence if patronage is insufficient. In order
to overcome these factors, the priority of the ECK and ultimately the Kenyan government
needs to be to change the incentives that currently dominate political competition. This
change can begin by reforming the present incentive system by means of the electoral
system, focusing on civic nationalism as the end goal. The promotion of civic
nationalism would allow Kenyans to see themselves as Kenyans first and members of an
ethnic community second. The new incentives in political competition need to promote
what is in the best interest of all Kenyans not what is best for one ethnic group. The key
lies in a process that leads to a government that is inclusive of all groups and of all
interests in its policies and practices. Whether this can be obtained through civic
nationalism has been challenged by many political scientists. One of the main criticisms
of promoting a civic identity is that an attachment to a nation is not likely to replace
loyalty to a group due to the greater emotional resonance in ethnic nationalism. 9 While
this argument has merit, especially given Kenya‟s historical background of ethnic
division, involvement in various types of organizations from political parties to religious

8

Roger Southall, “Alternatives for electoral reform in Kenya: Lessons from southern Africa,” Journal of
Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 27 No. 3 (2009): 448.
9
Stephen Shulman, “Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of
Nationalism.” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35 No. 5 (June 2002): 580.
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groups can also elicit emotionally charged feelings and actions that can supercede ethnic
loyalty.
Several different ways of using civic nationalism to combat ethnic divisions have
been suggested which include:


The promotion of a single language



The emphasis of ethnic peace in educational systems



The abolition of traditional chiefs



And electoral reform

What makes electoral reform stand out among these options in Kenya is that it provides
an opportunity for the government and politicians to work through an established
institution (elections) that is already accepted by the people. By focusing specifically on
the electoral system in promoting civic nationalism in ethnically diverse countries,
African states can begin to build trust between themselves and the people, negating some
of the criticisms of civic nationalism. What is crucial is emphasizing the importance of
the system and portraying the benefits of such a system directly to the people. If a state
can provide support for ethnic and cultural components of a society through state and
political institutions, while not letting these features dominate the system, civic
nationalism can garner support. While clearly it will take more than simply reforming
the electoral system, encompassing change from voting structures to political parties to
the ECK, these three areas of electoral reform provide visible changes for creating a
political competition based on civic nationalism. Since elections draw both national and
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international attention, they present a prime opportunity to encourage politicians and
voters to begin thinking nationally, not ethnically.
Examining theory and terminology behind ethnic groups provides a basis for
understanding why ethnicity remains a prominent source of identification in Africa.
Throughout this thesis, ethnic group refers to: “an ascriptive social collectivity whose
members not only share such objective characteristics as group name, core territory,
language, ancestral myths, culture, religion, and/or political organization, but also possess
some subjective consciousness or perception of common identity or descent.”10 Ethnicity
will denote: “the mobilization and politicization of ethnic-group identity in situations of
competitive or conflictual pluralism.” 11 How ethnic groups function within states varies
based on structural components of ethnicity. One distinction is ranked ethnic groups
versus unranked ethnic classification, where ranked ethnic groups are based on socioeconomic terms or class that result in a stratification of ethnic groups creating a hierarchy
whereas in unranked ethnic classification class has no bearing. 12 While most African
countries are characterized by unranked ethnic groups, a few ethnic systems such as
Rwanda and Apartheid South Africa provide examples of ranked ethnic classifications. 13
The greater number of unranked ethnic groups is significant as an important element of
this group is their highly competitive political orientation while ranked systems are often
more ideologically and socially entrenched. 14 This emphasizes the need to monitor

10

Hyden, 124.
Ibid.
12
Ibid., 126.
13
Ibid., 127.
14
Ibid.
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political structures more closely in unranked systems in order to avoid conflict that
potentially could arise due to the increase in political competitiveness.
Another factor that differs amongst states is ethnic systems that are centralized
and ethnic systems that are dispersed. Ethnically centralized states are characterized by a
few large ethnic groups that enjoy demographic or socio-economic predominance over
other groups and, as a result, can polarize all aspects of national politics through their
interactions and frictions.15 Countries such as Kenya and Uganda are examples of
relatively centralized ethnic states. Geographically, ethnic populations can be
concentrated or intermixed. Although geographically concentrated ethnic groups still
encapsulate most African states, urbanization and migration has increased the prevalence
of intermixed ethnic groups, especially in cities. 16 Geography can have a significant
influence on conflict between ethnic groups as, “It is broadly recognized that
geographically concentrated ethnic structures are relatively more conducive to interethnic peace, not only because inter-ethnic intercourse and friction are less socially
prevalent in such contexts but also because geographical concentration of identity groups
facilitates the implementation of federalist and other territorial formulas of ethnic
conflict-management.”17 All of these distinctions can help to explain the role that
ethnicity plays in individual countries throughout Africa. However, while these features
help categorize countries, they are not always indicative of whether ethnic conflict might
arise.

15

Hyden, 127.
Ibid.
17
Ibid., 127-128.
16
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There is still much debate on why and to what degree ethnicity has been able to
infiltrate the political and social structures of many African societies, but there are two
main theories about the role of ethnicity as a key source of identification in Africa: (1)
ethnic identities reflect a sense of tradition where ethnicity is fundamentally part of a
people (primordialists), and (2) ethnicity is a dominate feature because it serves a
functional purpose in society (situationalists).18 The importance of the primodialist
theory is its critical function in helping to explain the psychological role of ethnic groups
in African societies and perhaps ascribe part of the reason ethnic conflicts often result in
violence. However, the situationalist argument addresses why politicization of ethnic
groups often occurs. Ethnic groups provide “a contingent malleable or pliable selfclassification that is often contrived by elites and their constituents to obtain economic or
other non-ethnic rewards.”19 The state, through governments and political figures, plays
a large role in how ethnic groups serve as a tool, utilized in social and political settings.
As an “organizing principle,” the state can animate, define, and frame the ethnic
behaviors of a country. 20 The impact of ethnicity on a society can be greatly influenced
by political instruments created by the state to mediate and regulate the competition
amongst ethnic groups. Scholars have identified three institutional paradigms African
states tend to resort to in dealing with ethnicity: hegemonic repression, hegemonic
exchange, and polyarchial or non-hegemonic exchange. 21 Hegemonic repression
involves state power being controlled by one-party, often a military regime. The danger

18

Benn Eifert and others, “Political Competition and Ethnic Identification in Africa.” American Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 54 No. 2 (April 2010): 494-520.
19
Hyden, 125.
20
Ibid., 126.
21
Ibid., 130.
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of hegemonic repression is that it alienates certain groups while providing privileges for
another which can often result in rebellion or resistance. Hegemonic exchange combines
both elements of an authoritarian government with special rules, policies and practices
intended to deal with diverse ethnic groups. Kenya, under the leadership of Jomo
Kenyatta, provides an example of a period of hegemonic exchange regime as Kenyatta
strove to balance his position as leader of the Kenyan nation with that as a patron of the
Kikuyu ethnic group.22 Even though hegemonic exchange regimes attempt to create a
sense of stability between state-ethnic and interethnic relations, ultimately, the dominant
tendency is to manipulate and appropriate ethnic relations in a way that helps secure the
survival of the hegemony in power.23 And because there is a tendency of rulers to focus
on self-survival, any ethnic networks or linkages established often disintegrate with the
rise of a new political order as the ethnic relations are based on informal, personal
relationships as opposed to formal agreements or constitutional rules. 24 This is further
extenuated by the role of patrimonialism in African politics, where competition for
resources and ethno-clientelistic patronage networks dominate government actions over
the development of progressive and policy oriented objectives to manage ethnic
divisions.25 Polyarchical exchange involves a liberal democracy regime that utilizes the
rule of law and special institutions to address ethnic divides. 26 Four devices drive ethnic
interactions and management in a polyarchial exchange regime: democracy, autonomism,

22

Hyden, 134.
Ibid., 133 and 135.
24
Ibid., 135.
25
Ibid., 136.
26
Ibid.
23
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proportionality, and minority rights. 27 In this type of governance, the focus is not on
manipulating ethnicity but creating institutions that effectively address the concerns that
develop as a result of ethnic pluralism. The overall goal that governments should strive
for in regards to ethnicity can be summarized as thus: “governance as an approach to
ethnicity would seek to identify and create rules and institutions that may promote equity
and amity in inter-ethnic and/or state-ethnic relations and generally channel ethnicity
along constructive, rather than oppressive or destructive lines.” 28 However, the
establishment of these mechanisms by governments has been anything but stable.
Nigeria provides an example of a country that embraced polyarchial exchange but slowly
deteriorated into a repressive military hegemonic regime. 29 Where it is difficult to
establish a stable form of government, the challenges facing the implementation of a
legitimate electoral system is even greater.
Ethnicity in Africa has emerged as a result of political competition established
and promoted by those in and seeking power. Serving as a political tool, ethnicity is used
for: “mobilizing people, policing boundaries, and building coalitions that can be deployed
in the struggle for power and scarce resources.”30 Two dominant features can be
distinguished in the use of ethnic groups as a tool: (1) the promotion of ethnic identities is
employed to gain state-controlled power and (2) they are used to exploit economic
resources. The reliance on ethnicity for political competition flourishes during times of
presidential, parliamentary, constitutional, and general elections. The two key
mechanisms that support the increased importance of ethnic identity revolving around
27

Hyden, 143.
Ibid., 124-125.
29
Ibid., 138.
30
Eifert, 494.
28
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elections are the same as stated above: the control of state-power and economic
resources. In elections, “ethnic identities are tools that people use to get access to
political power.”31 Elections renew awareness of the political power that is at stake and
therefore impact the electoral process by emphasizing ethnic identity above all else:
First, it is widely recognized that the growth and concentration of
resources in the state has increased the salience of state control for ethnic
groups as much as for individuals, and, hence, has produced a zero sum
ethnic struggle for political power. Second, with the whole process of
class formation and consolidation at stake for the political class,
politicians have been prone to manipulate ethnic attachments and tears as
a means both for mobilizing electoral support and for diverting attention
from their own corrupt accumulation and abuse of power.32
In the time leading up to elections, many politicians embrace the psychological influence
of ethnic identity and thus “play the ethnic card” in an attempt to bolster support. This
tactic brings ethnicity to the forefront of voters‟ minds and displaces other identities like
membership in religious communities, a particular socio-economic class, and gender
categories.33 Political leaders encourage this emergence of ethnocentrism during elections
because it is one of the easiest ways to mobilize support.
This ease of mobilizing support is due in large part to the second force that comes
into play during elections (one that politicians do not even have to embrace as a tactic),
the competition for economic resources. Without politicians vocalizing the fact, voters
recognize the historical importance of ethnic groups in the distribution of economic
resources. The allocation of resources in Africa historically follows ethnic lines and
election results determine who will be distributing the resources.34 At both the local and

31

Eifert, 494.
Hyden, 128-129.
33
Eifert, 495.
34
Ibid.
32
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national level, leaders often allocate to their ethnic groups considerable economic
resources as a way to maintain political influence and control over various ethnic
groups.35 As a result of the politicization of ethnic identities, ethnic group loyalties move
beyond the private sphere into the public sphere. 36 Beyond the command of bloodrelationships, ethnic solidarity provides economic security. This economic security, goes
outside competition between ethnic groups, but is the means for survival. A fear that has
been planted in many African populations is that without a member of their ethnic group
in power, they will increasingly face a daily struggle to survive. This reliance on
patronage in regards to economic resources essentially enables leaders to buy support
from their ethnic group.37 But the problem of the use of ethnicity in elections goes
deeper than just its exploitation: “participation in public affairs is reduced to a game of
advocating ethnic interests rather than building structures that can guarantee equal
participation, justice, and development for all. Consequently, people no longer see hard
work as the source of economic success.” 38 The repercussion of a political system reliant
on ethnic mobilization is that the focus of elections shifts from voting for what is best for
a country regarding economic performance, health services, education, and the common
good. 39 The focus is shifted solely to enabling a certain ethnic group to control the state.
While multi-party politics may have been introduced in many African states in the
1990‟s, these political parties typically became groups divided along ethnic lines. The
emphasis to keep their ethnic group member in power has increasingly led to the isolation
35

Aquiline Tarimo, “Politicization of Ethnic Identities: The Case of Contemporary Africa.” Journal of
Asian and African Studies 45 (2010): 303.
36
Ibid., 304.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
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of the less dominant ethnic groups: “Those who belong to the less dominant ethnic
groups feel left out and discriminated against by the system. In turn, they feel obliged to
act, legally or illegally, to ensure their survival. The tendency of self-assertion emerging
from different ethnic groups for survival is, in fact, the root cause of the widespread
conflicts in Africa today.”40 It is still largely debated to what extent ethnicity plays a role
in the conflicts that afflict much of the African continent, but, clearly it plays a part in the
instability of many African electoral institutions. The weight placed on ethnicity during
elections has created a cycle of dependence as both politicians and voters feel obligated
to utilize their ethnic groups as a way to survive.
The link between political competition and ethnic identification in Africa has led
to the exercise of exploiting ethnic groups, particularly in periods surrounding elections.
A study conducted by Benn Eifert, et al., evaluated data from over 35,000 respondents in
22 public opinion surveys conducted in 10 countries between 1999 and 2004 on the
political sources of ethnic identification. 41 Their studies were founded on two key
hypotheses: first, as ethnic identities provide a way for people to access political power,
during election times when power is at stake, these identities are likely to become more
salient; and second, that ethnicity will become an even greater factor in a highly
contested and competitive election.42 Their findings supported ethnicity as instrumental
in political competitions as a result of the close correspondence between ethnic
identification and the electoral cycle. 43 Most significantly, they found that political

40

Tarimo, 305.
Eifert, 497. The ten countries where these surveys were distributed were: Botswana, Malawi, Mali,
Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
42
Ibid., 494.
43
Ibid., 495.
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competition raises salience of ethnic identity for all citizens. 44 Ethnic attachments in the
countries studied were found to be the strongest during periods preceding and following
competitive national elections. This is in part due to the increased use of the “ethnic
card” played by politicians to rally support as well as the persistent weight of resources
on the minds of the voters. Regular citizens (versus elites) are often the most impacted
by this secondary influence as they rely on the belief that jobs, favors, and public goods
will be disproportionately directed to co-ethnics of the person in power who controls
them.45 The question that arises is to what extent voters are being manipulated versus
how much politicians are simply playing into their expectations. The role of these two
factors has resulted in an electoral cycle in Africa:
Politicians will only invoke the need for voters to support members of
their ethnic groups if they believe that such appeals will resonate, which in
turn will depend on voters‟ beliefs about how patronage is channeled in
Africa. Similarly, although most citizens do not need to be reminded that
their ethnic connection with the election‟s winner is likely to affect the
level of resource they will receive in the election‟s aftermath, politicians‟
ethnic appeals almost certainly reinforce such expectations. The result is
an equilibrium in which expectations of ethnic favoritism by voters
generate ethnic appeals by politicians which, in turn, reinforce voters‟
expectations of ethnic favoritism. 46
This cycle creates a dangerous precedent for voters and politicians. Even if just one
political party resorts to the promotion of ethnic identity, it can begin a process of
ethnicization of all political parties. Opposition parties often start this process by
44

Eifert, 496. The study looked at certain theories regarding ethnicity to analyze the range of the
population that political competition impacted as far as ethnic identification. First was the theory that
group size creates incentives for ethnic mobilization. The study did not find evidence of the size of ethnic
group affecting ethnic identification. Second, the study looked at whether supporters of current ruling
parties were more or less likely to ethnically identify themselves. The study found these supporters to be
no different than supporters of parties that were not in power. Finally, the study explored the idea of young
men as especially likely to identify ethnically. Again the results found there to be no significant evidence
that this particular subset of the population was more likely to identify in ethnic terms.
45
Ibid., 507.
46
Ibid., 507-508.
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criticizing the ruling party for discriminating against members of other ethnic groups.47
The ruling party often responds with a counter-mobilization of its ethnic group.
Consequently, ethnicity persistently becomes the focus of elections in Africa.
The cyclical nature of ethnic hostilities in Africa frequently compliments election
cycles. Political competition has fallen into a pattern of utilizing ethnicity as a tool to
win elections. This precedent needs to be altered but the current indifference by African
leaders makes resolving this problem challenging: “The problem in Africa so far has been
the little interest that the continent‟s political leaders have shown in dealing with
ethnicity in terms of constitutional and legal provisions that enable people to feel secure
and governments able to manage this set of issues in a manner constructive to both itself
and its citizens.”48 Political leaders seem to have a larger interest in using ethnicity for
personal benefit than for the greater good of the people. Because elections make
ethnicity more salient, one of the ways to address this mobilization is for African
governments to develop policies and institutional mechanisms regarding the electoral
process that limit the destructive use of ethnic divisions. 49 Since ethnic identities are
strengthened by political competition, these policies and institutions need to focus on the
electoral process and other political instruments that lead to competition: “much can still
be done to institutionalize, improve, and expand proportionality practices in Africa,
especially through the design of electoral systems that may secure inter-ethnic
moderation, toleration, and coalition by inducing and compelling candidates and parties

47

Eifert, 508.
Hyden, 147.
49
Eifert, 508.
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to seek electoral support across ethnic boundaries.”50 These changes in structure and
practices can only be implemented by promoting a larger goal that explains the need for
structural adjustment. The new electoral system should encourage nationalism.
In regards to Kenya and many other multi-ethnic countries in Africa, the problem
with the current electoral system is its support of a precarious type of nationalism. The
theory behind using nationalism as a means to unify a country is that it provides an
effective way to center the focus of a nation to the common good of all. However, this is
not the case with all types of nationalism. There are two dominant types of nationalism:
civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. 51 Key components of civic nationalism include:
territory, citizenship, will and consent, political ideology, and political institutions and
rights.52 The key difference between civic and ethnic nationalism is what state structures
put into focus. Ethnic nationalism directs focus to common language, religion, customs,
and traditions of a country while civic nationalism turns focus to a shared set of political
practices and values.53 While civic nationalism centers on a sense of equal community,
ethnic nationalism emphasizes trust only from those in your own blood line. 54 This
element of trust in political institutions that civic nationalism provides is essential as it
promotes unity of a whole instead of just a part. But trust in political institutions in
Africa is not easily come by. Many African countries have turned to ethno-nationalism
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because of mistrust in political institutions. 55 These “civic deserts” can partially be
explained by the effects of colonization which often destroyed the civic societies that
were previously established. Once these countries gained independence, the newness of
these states and regimes made it difficult to establish political and legal institutions that
were often unfamiliar. 56 Ethnic nationalism, therefore “fills an institutional vacuum.” 57
When civic institutions have failed in the eyes of the population, ethnic nationalism
becomes the default option: “It predominates when institutions collapse, when existing
institutions were not fulfilling people‟s basic needs, and when satisfactory alternative
structures are not readily available.” 58 Since many African countries have fallen into this
pattern, it makes the establishment of stable civic structures more and more challenging
each time one fails. This is why the state needs to first focus on reform of electoral
institutions. Trying to tackle the whole political system is too grand an idea and one that
does not directly relate to the people; however, by creating an election process where
citizens can actively participate and express their opinions in a legitimate forum, the state
can portray positive reform in an effort to implement a stable and trustworthy
government. Reform in the electoral process and institutions is one small step to building
a country based on civic nationalism and not ethnic divisions.
In countries with not only ethnically diverse populations but ones with numerous
languages, religions, and traditions, uniting a country already divided by ethnic
nationalism proves exceedingly difficult. However, civic nationalism does not mean that
the ethnic components of a country cease to exist: “A truly civic conception of the nation
55
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entails no need for cultural unity. People in a purely civic nation are united by such traits
as common citizenship, respect for law and state institutions, belief in a set of political
principles, and so forth. Similarity in language, religion, and other cultural markers is not
necessary for the development of such traits.”59 This strategy means that ethnic groups
can still exist within the nation; they just do not dominate state institutions. From the
promotion of community trust to the maintenance of the cultural aspects of different
ethnic groups, civic nationalism has the potential to positively transform a state and shift
the public‟s attention from ethnically motivated actions to those for the greater good.
An electoral system that is not dominated by ethnicity will lead to a decrease in
ethnic tensions. While ethnic groups and cultural traditions remain intact and continue to
be a source of identification, in a political system that encourages the good of the whole,
in times of political competition, ethnicity will not be wielded as a weapon by the
opposition and a tool by incumbents. The stability that results from an unyielding
electoral system in regards to the use of ethnicity can provide the groundwork for
stability to spread to other government institutions such as areas of economics, health,
and safety. This stability will continue to undermine reliance on ethnicity for power, and
will increase the mechanisms available for all people as a means for survival. By
reforming a small part of the larger political system, African governments can begin to
encourage ethnic groups to work together for their common good
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Chapter 1First-Past-The-Post

“To imagine that with the stroke of a pen what is defective will be made
good, that it will be easy to reverse 45 years of post-colonial, stumbling
democracy.”
-The Kriegler Commission

The first-past-the-post (FPTP) election system was inherited from Great Britain. In this
style of voting, an election is won by the candidate who receives the most votes. The candidate
does not have to receive a majority of the votes to win. This voting system encourages a zerosum style of politics which, in a country like Kenya, leads to ethnic campaigning because losing
an election means the loss of power and the loss of resources associated with that power. 1 The
concern is that this system has at times led to varying levels of ethnic cleansing due to the
ideology that in order for one ethnic group to win another must lose. In order to diminish the
current zero-sum mentality of political competition in Kenya, the voting system needs to be
changed to a closed list PR system in parliamentary elections and to a two-round system in
presidential elections.

Section A- Colonialism: Majimboism and Land
Colonial practices largely influenced the emergence of ethnically centered institutions
throughout Kenyan society. With the establishment of the FPTP system in the late colonial/postcolonial era, its limitations began to shape ethnicity in Kenya. The Mau Mau freedom fighters,
formed during colonial rule in the 1950s and who essentially initiated the struggle for
independence, represent a momentous struggle for land in Kenya‟s history that resulted in
violence. Their eventual victory led to one of Kenya‟s greatest land grabs that continues to cause
1
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problems today (see Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion of the role of Mau Mau). In the
period leading up to independence, Kenyan leaders had a choice to make regarding state
structures that would ultimately determine electoral institutions. The two dominant parties at
independence, which were formed along ethnic lines, prescribed different structures of
government. The Kenyan African Democratic Party (KADU) promoted a federal structure of
government based on regional responsibility for the administration of land in the designated
territories known as Majimbo. 2 Majimboism was essentially ethnic based federalism. 3 KADU‟s
endorsement of this style of government was based on the idea of recovery of traditional
territories by certain ethnic groups (specifically in the White Highlands which would leave the
Kalenjin and Masai with native rights to the land as settlers left), back to the pre-colonial land
spheres prior to the migration of ethnic groups that occurred during the colonial period. 4 Critics
of this system, however, argued that Majimboism would lead to larger community expansion into
smaller communities, which would potentially threaten minority ethnic groups. 5 In contrast, the
Kenyan African National Union (KANU), predominately comprised of Kikuyu and Luo ethnic
groups, sponsored a unitary government committed to upholding and respecting property rights. 6
Despite these differences, each party was concerned with which ethnic groups would obtain the
land in the White Highlands. This issue became the center of the creation of the Kenyan state.
The fight between ethnic groups for land control was begun and then greatly exacerbated under
colonial rule, making it difficult for the post-colonial government to look beyond ethnic groups
when creating government structures.
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As the colonial government slowly began to unwind, African groups began to promote
the re-Africanization of the White Highlands due to its agricultural wealth. This process,
however, led to the emergence of landless squatters, specifically the Kikuyu, who had comprised
a large contingent of the Mau Mau freedom fighters, who were threatening to reassemble if they
were not given some of the land they deemed was owed to them. 7 The Kikuyu squatters further
antagonized the relations between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin and as a result, the government‟s
abilities to take ethnicity out of the equation were hindered: “The re-Africanisation of the White
Highlands and increased focus on the Kikuyu ethnicised the land question and cultivated
conditions for mobilizing ethnicity as a means of accessing land rights.”8 Attempting to address
the landless people issue, the government implemented a string of settlement schemes, however,
these plans fell short of fulfilling the land desires of all the landless people and they also
contained an ethnic dimension: “A larger number of beneficiaries who were Kikuyu, compared
with those form other communities, created a perception that the schemes were meant to satisfy
land hunger among Kikuyu rather than any other community.” 9 As the issues surrounding the
land questions morphed into ethnic components, the spillover was seen in national politics. The
Regional Boundaries Commission of 1962 drew new district boundaries that were largely
ethnically based, with groups seeking to be together or separated from others depending on
perceived land threats.10 The large resettlement of Kikuyu in traditionally Masai and Kalenjin
territory “aroused ethnic animosity and tensions, adding to tensions that accompanied hostility
around the negotiations for independence.”11 Instead of concentrating on obtaining independence
of the Kenyan people as a whole, the focus was on ethnicity.

7

Kanyinga, 329.
Ibid., 330.
9
Ibid., 331.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid., 332.
8

25

With the KANU victory in pre-independence elections in 1963, the new administration
under President Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) commenced land reform under the auspices of a
unitary form of government seeking economic stability, thereby squashing the demand for the
sanctity of traditional ethnic territories. 12 Throughout the 1960s the new administration sought to
ensure economic stability by addressing the largest source of political unrest at the time, that of
the Kikuyu landless in the Rift Valley. 13 Desire for the control of land manifested itself in
political and economic security and resources as ethnic groups gained political power. However,
the continual competition for land, exacerbated by land-buying companies, intensified interethnic rivalries as elite members used them to increase their social bases of power, thus
consolidating the political positions of their ethnic groups.14 Although there was a relative period
of calm in the 1970‟s and 1980‟s under President Moi, as his interests were aligned with that of
the Kikuyu landed, the 1990‟s saw the re-emergence of ethnic campaigns regarding land. 15 As
political (inherently ethnic) groups mobilized around land issues, violence related to land began
to follow election cycles. 16
The Rift Valley has played a large role in violence that breaks out during elections due to
its historically significant role in Kenya‟s national politics. It is a multi-ethnic region
encompassing Kalenjin, Masai, Kikuyu, and Luhya ethnic groups. The region has the largest
share of total national votes and parliamentary constituencies, making it appealing for parties to
obtain political seats by focusing on the various ethnic blocs in this single area. 17 And finally,
like the former White Highlands, ethnic political competition to gain land has been a dominant
feature of the region, resulting in ethnically motivated violence. 18 The Rift Valley presents a
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prime example of why the current voting system causes more damage to Kenyan society than it
does good.
Based on historical experience, while the FPTP system helped establish electoral
practices in Kenya, the plurality system lends itself to widespread corruption and manipulation by
incumbent ruling parties which has been seen through the management of land. 19 The period
leading up to the 2007 elections saw many of the same patterns emerge.

Section B- Zero-Sum Mentality
Resentment regarding land allocation and ownership continued to taint the political
process in the period before the 2007 elections. Regarding the constitutional referendum in 2005,
“It was said that the proposed constitution was defeated because the Kikuyu political elite, who
were in central positions in government, were not keen to share political power with other tribes.
Issues of land and the domination of Kikuyu in the settlement schemes in the Rift Valley shaped
those perceptions. The ensuing conflicts were an expression of resentment over wrongs arising
from how land issues were addressed.”20 Majimboists re-emerged under the Orange Democratic
Movement (ODM), which supported federalism as the best way for policy to be pursued so that
people could make decisions on matter specifically concerning their regions. 21 In contrast, the
Party of National Unity (PNU) argued against Majimbo, claiming that such a policy would
undermine national unity.22 Representation at all government levels was obviously a concern of
both the constituents and political parties. The 2007 elections saw 2548 candidates in the race for
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only 210 seats in Kenya‟s National Assembly (parliament), based on single-member
constituencies.23
Instances of violence sprung up prior to the election based on trying to dissuade voter
turnout. For example, “In Kuresoi, violence continued up to a few weeks preceding the 2007
December general election and may have been aimed at reducing voter turnout for the multiethnic Kuresoi parliamentary constituency.”24 The current FPTP system encourages these
practices as the zero-sum mentality it perpetuates leads people to take drastic measures to ensure
the vote goes in their favor.

Section C- Reform Options
Kenya needs a system of electoral voting that does not emphasize the winner-take-all
approach that FPTP currently props up. The current delimitation of boundaries used in these
voting structures does not represent the basic principle of the equality of the vote. 25 Kenya needs
a system that will incentivize political parties and politicians to compete for votes across ethnic
lines. The Kriegler Commission, charged with analyzing the 2007 elections, provided a few
alternatives to the current FPTP system26:


A two-round presidential and parliamentary system



Mixed-Member Proportional representation (MMP) based on one ballot (requiring
changing the current constituency structure)



Closed list proportional representation (PR) at the provincial level (emphasizing „gender
zipping‟ to increase fairer representation of women)
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Closed list PR (also emphasizing „gender zipping‟ to increase fairer representation of
women) at the national level

These alternatives will be discussed by addressing parliamentary and presidential systems
separately as each encompasses its own set of issues and requires different remedies.

Parliamentary Electoral Reform Options
Of course the easiest approach to electoral reform with minimal change would be to
maintain the FPTP system but alter constituencies to promote a more equitable delimitation of
ethnic groups. While limited change might be less challenging to implement in the short run,
simply changing constituencies will not change the inherent problems that plague the FPTP
system. It would fail to eliminate the winner/loser mentality as winning parties would still have a
disproportionally larger number of seats relative to the votes cast for the losing party. 27 It would
be very easy for ruling parties to skew the constituency boundaries in a way that was
advantageous to the party during elections. The manipulation of constituency delimitations is
also problematic in rural areas as they have been principally based around ethnic groups, which
further encourages the politicization of ethnicity. 28 The result is the creation of the ethnic „other,‟
whereby ethnic hostilities are cultivated. This then prompts political alliances centered on ethnic
arithmetic.29 Both of these issues leave the zero-sum mentality at the forefront of voting,
allowing ethnicity to continue to dominate the system. If such a system were to work, the key
would be a neutral constituency delimitation process that aimed at equalizing the „weight‟ of

27

Southall, 449.
Ibid.
29
Ibid..
28

29

individual votes.30 The success of this would be based on the public trust placed on the neutrality
of the re-districting constituencies.31
The two-round system of parliamentary elections changes from FPTP as it requires a
majority of the vote to win. If no candidate wins a majority of the vote in the first-round within a
parliamentary constituency election, then a second round would be conducted where the two
candidates who had the most votes would have a run off. The implementation of this system
would not only require more work for electoral institutions (like the Electoral Commission of
Kenya [ECK] which already seems to be unable to handle its responsibilities [see chapter three
for an analysis of the ECK]) by having to run two rounds of voting not just one, but it would also
likely result in more petitions as third place candidates might protest the results for the second
place position.32 This would only serve to slow up the entire electoral process and would likely
not even address the ethnic component of voting as the run-off would still be along ethnic lines.
Mixed-Member Proportional representation, based on a single ballot vote, is a more
inclusive voting system that attempts to make sure representation ends up proportionally
representing the votes cast instead of it just being based on who has the most votes. The
objective of an MMP electoral system is “to rectify imbalances in electoral outcomes produced by
constituency elections through the simultaneous holding of a separate PR list election, whereby
political parties put up slates of nominated candidates, a proportionate number of these candidates
being elected according to the number of votes cast for the different parties.” 33 The principle
behind the MMP is that the overall total of party members that is elected should mirror the
proportion of votes received. In order to compensate for smaller parties that are often underrepresented in parliament, extra seats would be given to these parties based on their proportional
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representation of the vote.34 The party with the largest number of candidates elected directly
from constituencies will not gain further seats in parliament from the PR list.35 Essentially the
additional party seats in parliament compensate opposition parties, “topping up” local results. 36
The single-vote system would mean that a voter‟s vote for a candidate in constituency elections
would also count as his/her party vote for the PR reckoning. 37
The final recommendation by the Kriegler Commission was the closed list PR at both
provincial and national levels, where voters vote for a political party from a list of candidates
provided by the party.38 The principle justification for using the closed list PR system is that it
allows minorities representation while at the same time discouraging political mobilization
centered on ethnicity or race.39 The idea is that if there are no numerically dominant ethnic
groups then the list PR system will diminish incentives for parties to campaign on the grounds of
ethnicity. 40 Instead politicians would need to appeal to voters across ethnicities: “by encouraging
bids by politicians across the spectrum of race, ethnicity, and religion, PR fosters mutual
accommodation.”41
Each of these systems will be furthered scrutinized following the discussion of
presidential electoral reform options.

Presidential Electoral Reform Options
Kenyan current electoral rules designate three requirements in order to be elected
president: (1) a candidate must win in a nation-wide count, (2) secure at least 25% of the vote in
34
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five of the eight provinces, and (3) must win the parliamentary seat in their own constituency. 42
The FPTP system of voting for president has clearly proven to be ineffective at representing the
interests of the people and its flaws were demonstrated by the violence that ensued after the
release of the rather dubious election results. A president elected by minority vote does not
represent who the people want.
The Kriegler Commission suggested the use of a two-round presidential election, with the
second round consisting of the two candidates with the most votes. The goal of this system is to
eliminate the possibility of a candidate becoming president with a minority vote. If this system
had been used in the 2007 elections, using the ECK‟s questionable data, Kibaki and Odinga
would have moved on to the second round (with 46.4% and 44.1% of the votes respectively).43
Then people would have had to vote between these two candidates, the winner being the
candidate to receive the majority of the vote (over 50%). A second recommendation that was
briefly alluded to is returning to the pre-1992 elections where presidents were elected directly by
parliament.44 In theory this would mean that the president would be dependent on the majority in
parliament. The reform options for the presidency are obviously less extensive than the many
electoral options for parliament. This is rather disconcerting as many claim it is the overly
powerful office of the presidency that has played a role in the escalating ethnic tensions in Kenya.

Section D- Recommendations
Each of these electoral systems has positives and negatives, experiencing successes and
failures in other African countries with multi-ethnic backgrounds. The recommendations that
follow utilize experiences from other African countries and apply their ideas to Kenya‟s unique
situation, the foremost concern being to implement a system that decreases the salience of
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ethnicity in elections. With Kenya‟s current limitations, the voting system needs to be changed to
a closed list PR system in parliamentary elections and to a two-round system in presidential
elections.

Parliamentary Electoral Reform Recommendation
Reform is more easily accepted in society when the change is relatively small. This
explains the appeal of keeping the FPTP voting system and simply changing constituency
boundaries in an attempt to decrease the ethnic factors that currently inhibit the FPTP system.
Unfortunately, a small change will not suffice to make the impact needed to de-emphasize
ethnicity in voting. The trust that would need to be placed in the hands of the institute creating
new constituency boundaries to support the FPTP system is absent in Kenyan society. After all
of the questions surrounding the 2007 elections and the role of ECK, trust in electoral systems
and those in charge of them is greatly lacking. The delimitation of borders would be further
complicated especially in rural areas as ethnic groups are largely divided regionally. Thus, a
voting system based on boundaries would not eliminate the use of ethnic coalitions in order to
gain power. Changing constituencies would have little impact on addressing the ethnic issues
that FPTP already fails to deal with and perpetuates.
The two-round system, while achievable for presidential elections (see Presidential
Electoral Reform below), creates even more work for a system that already consists of 210
constituencies. Only if the number of constituencies was decreased would this become a viable
option.
MMP representation was initially successful in Lesotho following its implementation for
the 2002 elections. Although it took help from the South African government to negotiate the use
of MMP, the result was that while the Lesotho Congress of Democracy (LCD) won all but one of
the 79 constituencies with only 57.7% of the vote, the allocation of extra seats based on the
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system of national list representation allowed opposition parties to gain representation in
parliament.45 Voters did not appear to have difficulty voting for both individual party candidates
in constituency elections and then for parties in the PR ballot; 46 however, Lesotho ran into
problems in its 2007 elections. Based on the election results, LCD was the winning party so it did
not receive seats under the PR poll. However, the LCD made an alliance with an opposition
party, allowing it to essentially secure seats under the PR poll, undermining the intention of
MMP.47 The single-vote system suggested by the Kriegler Commission would help avoid such a
situation from occurring in Kenya. While this system was relatively successful in Lesotho, MMP
does come with its own set of problems. First of all, MMPs still require equitable constituency
boundaries which have proven to be a challenge for both reasons of trust and implementation.
Parliament would also need to be expanded (a financially costly option) or the number of
constituencies would need to be reduced (which could lead to protests from ethnic groups worried
about losing an advantage). 48 Another concern would be the treatment of PR Members of
Parliament (MPs) as second class citizens as was exemplified in Lesotho.49 Perhaps more
importantly, “if constituencies continued in essence to represent voters according to ethnicity, as
is likely, then the capacity of MMP to diminish the political salience of ethnicity would be
limited.”50 Thus, MMP still does not take away the ethnic component of voting, but it is at least a
step in the right direction, allowing for more diverse representation in parliament.
The closed list PR system is the best solution for Kenya at this point in time. It achieved
relative success in post-apartheid South Africa. The system was implemented in South Africa
just prior to the 1994 elections. Like most countries‟ experience with list PRs, one of the
negative aspects is that power becomes greatly concentrated in the hands of parties and party
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leaders, taking power away from the people. 51 The party bosses then have the power to control
not only placement of individuals on party lists (which could be based on ethnicity), but they
could also expel people from the party to keep them out of parliament.52 This would mean that
individual MPs would be held responsible to the party above constituents which would be
positive if parties represented a large group of constituents, but since parties also tend to run
along ethnic lines, this system would allow for the continuation of party politics based on ethnic
groups. It could also promote the explosion of even more political parties resulting in each ethnic
group having its own party. The incentive to form small parties as a result of a proportional
representation system can be seen in the case of Israel. 53 Under the current system, political
parties and ethnic groups are forced into alliances and coalitions when elections approach. The
suggestion for Kenya is that since it has familiarity with constituencies, its adoption of the list PR
system operating in its eight provinces would ensure that the individual members of
constituencies retained a degree of accountability to their region. 54 If Kenya were to use a PR
system with these eight provinces as constituencies, the ethnic factors would be greatly reduced:
“the fact that the provincial constituencies would be relatively large and multi-ethnic would mean
that candidates would be hard pressed to restrict their appeal to a narrow set of particular ethnic
groups.”55 Additionally, demarcation by province would help create an electoral framework for
second-tier provincial assemblies if a Majimbo system of government was implemented in the
future.56 To date the ECK, whose responsibility it is to define constituency boundaries, has
largely not performed the role. It blames the unwillingness on Parliament to increase the number
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of constituencies. 57 However, with 210 constituencies already, more constituencies would simply
increase the amount of work for the ECK in elections. The appropriate number of constituencies
that should be redrawn needs more research and evaluation, but as constituencies have often been
the source of ethnic divisions, it is crucial that the number of constituencies decrease so they
become more ethnically diverse. There is always the concern of scare tactics being used by larger
ethnic groups within constituencies against smaller groups in order to get the votes they desire,
but the PR system would at least give smaller groups within the provinces some representation.
The PR system would essentially make up for having larger districts. It is critical, however, that
constituencies do not become too large, as it is these constituencies and the MPs who represent
them that know the needs of the local communities within them.
The closed PR system would also allow for the elimination of the 12 MPs the president
can currently nominate after an election. Historically these nominations have been handpicked by
the president for his own benefit instead of these 12 members being nominated by the political
parties based on a proportionate representation in parliament. 58 While it would be beneficial to
use these seats to increase the representation of women, small ethnic groups, and other special
interests such as the disabled, the likelihood of corruption makes this too risky and likely
unbeneficial to the parties it is supposed to help. 59 A lesson to be learned from South Africa‟s
experience with list PR is not to allow floor-crossing/party defections once MPs have been
elected. This practice distorted the proportionality that had been conveyed by voters, then
distorted public financing for parties, and also disrupted the internal functioning of political
parties. 60 Kenya‟s history with politicians switching allegiance (refer to Chapter 2 on political
parties and coalitions) would make floor-crossing a very likely, and disagreeable, outcome. The
closed list PR system is a place for Kenyan parliamentary electoral reform to begin. Its
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explanation to the public as a way to encompass all party interests will be critical in the success of
its acceptance and implementation into the Kenyan electoral system.

Presidential Electoral Reform Recommendation
Electoral reform for the office of president is extremely important in Kenya. One of the
major benefits of having a two round presidential election is the pressure it would take off the
incumbent to proclaim a “dubious victory.” 61 This would increase the legitimacy of the president
and at the same time defuse the pressures for the incumbent to act unconstitutionally in order to
maintain power.62 The days of presidents being elected directly by parliament are over. Now that
voting for the president has become an institutionalized feature for the public to interact in
choosing their leader, it would be difficult to take that power away. It would be increasingly
difficult to give the power back to parliament as the lack of legitimacy and trust in the eyes of the
people would greatly hinder any confidence in the president parliament chose.
Therefore, it is essential the Kenyan state seek presidential electoral reform in the guise
of a two-round system. If anything this will prevent a minority vote from inaugurating a
president, thus not representing the will of the people. While this reform will not change the
amount of power currently residing with the president (this will need to be addressed in many
different sectors of Kenyan society), it would guarantee that the president was ultimately desired
by a majority.
In its report, the IREC determined that simplicity was of the essence. As other multiethnic countries in Africa have struggled to find an electoral voting system that works within the
cultural confines of ethnically diverse societies, reform of the parliamentary and presidential
platforms will only address a piece of the political process that has instigated ethnicity as a
weapon for success.
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Chapter 2Political Parties and Campaigning
“Political party leaders in Kenya are their own worst enemies, the parties
are seen as an end in themselves rather than a means to an end”
-IREC

Most people would assume that an increase in public participation in elections is a
sign of positive involvement; however, public participation can also be the very source
that incites the problem: “Divisive tribal sentiments propagated by political parties and
their supporters were spread and relayed to the public by the media. Civil society was
accused of partiality; the faiths abandoned the true message, instead leading their flocks
to their respective ethnic nests. Observers to some extent assumed the role of
participants, with regrettable consequences.”1 Political parties in Kenya have certainly
embraced ethnic division as a way to gain political support and power and have spread
their messages through campaigning during elections, infecting all areas of society. The
structure of political parties and the style of campaigning within the present electoral
system only create winners who win everything or losers who lose everything in the eyes
of both politicians and constituents. If the current practices of political parties are not
modified, especially those during election campaigning, then ethnicity will continue to
dominate Kenya‟s political scene resulting in ethnic violence that has the potential to lead
to ethnic cleansing. The rules for political parties need to be redefined and better
mechanisms created for developing and enforcing these rules need to be established.
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Three types of political parties prevail in Kenyan politics: the mono-ethnic party,
the multi-ethnic alliance type, and the multi-ethnic integrative type.2 The use of
coalitions in Kenyan politics has dominated the political scene, especially in the periods
surrounding elections, largely as a result of the demographic reality that Kenya is made
up of 42 ethnic groups, resulting in a prevalence of ethnic minority groups. This makes
for a different political need to garner support during elections than say in countries like
Rwanda and Burundi which are ethnic bifurcations.3 The seven dominant ethnic groups
in Kenya are: the Kikuyu in Central and Eastern provinces (22%), the Luhya in the
Western province (14%), Luo in Nyanza Province (13%), the Kalenjin in central and
northern areas of the Rift Valley (12%), the Kamba in the Eastern Province (11%), the
Kissi in Nyanza (6%), and the Meru in the Eastern Province (6%).4 These ethnic groups
often form ethnic conglomerations from sub-groups or neighboring ethnic cousins as
elections spur the need for coalitions. For example, the Luhya group is comprised of 18
sub-tribes. 5 With these ethnic groups promoting their own interests, it is no wonder that
in the current system of democratization Kenya‟s political parties have grown from ten in
1992 to 160 by the end of 2008.6 With this background, political parties in Kenya come
to rely on ethnicity in elections: “Manipulation of mass ethnic feelings is often the surest
instrument of electoral success, democratic participation (in elections) serves to fan
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ethnic conflict at the mass level as well.” 7 This manipulation of ethnicity for political
success began long before modern day elections in Kenya.

Section A- Independence and Post-Colonialism
Political parties and campaigning have their roots in Kenya‟s colonial past. The
constructions of colonial rule and governance greatly shaped how these structures
function in modern Kenyan society.

Parties for Independence
“It is the institution of colonialism that created a common centre that all the
existing ethnic groups in given colonial states are at once required to relate to. The
emerging relations soon became relations of competition over access to goods and
services associated with modernity.” 8 The backdrop to ethnic political parties and
campaigning in elections was set during the colonial era with the establishment of the
colonial settler economy in Kenya. Land appropriation and alienation through colonial
law, such as the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915, enabled white settlers to occupy the
best land that could be of permanent use.9 This system bifurcated land into two arenas:
land for Africans entitled “native reserves” and land for European settlement (the White
Highlands) or “scheduled land.” 10 The resulting dual system of land administration and
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political governance not only took away land rights of Africans 11, but through the use of
taxation forced many Africans to migrate to the white highlands for wage labor on settler
farms.12 This put many ethnic groups in competition for the first time as previously
groups had been settled throughout Kenya. Ethnic groups were not only now interacting
in a closer vicinity to each other, but were given land units reserved specifically for each
ethnic group, laying the foundation for ethnic antagonism as land quality on the reserves
varied greatly. 13 Society was to be divided: “These native reserves laid a firm framework
for solidifying ethnicisation of Kenyan society. The administration placed solid
sociopolitical boundaries between the various units of the native reserves and by doing so
obstructed „political‟ interactions among the native reserves, and thus prevented interethnic political relationships.” 14 Instead of allowing the different ethnic groups to live
and work together, colonial structures purposefully instigated divisions in order to
maintain colonial rule. Finally, beginning in the 1940s, a group of Kenyans
(predominately Kikuyu), which the British named the Mau Mau, began to rebel against
the colonial government.15 Their rebellion eventually led the British to declare a state of
emergency in Kenya that lasted from 1952 until 1959. The irony of this period of
struggle is that instead of addressing the colonial injustices regarding land, the
reallocation of land in the late colonial and post-colonial period actually increased
unequal patterns of land access and ownership across class and ethnic lines.16 This was
largely a consequence of Kikuyu dominance in rebellion against the British resulting in a
11

I use the term African here as the modern Kenyan state did not exist at this time so using the term
Kenyan would be inaccurate.
12
Kanyinga, 328.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Kagwanja and Southall, 268.

41

sense of entitlement. Therefore, the political parties that were formed after the state of
emergency ended, KANU and KADU (see Chapter 1 for a previous discussion), were
both formed on the basis of ethnic groups.17
The tensions between ethnic groups that were exacerbated during the colonial
period as a result of land distribution help explain why political parties and campaigning
still center on the ethnic unit. Afraid of being dealt a bad hand again, members of each
ethnic group want to make sure they are getting the best resources they can and that
another group is not receiving an unfair advantage. Because politicians and constituents
have become driven by clientism with a winner-take-all view regarding political power
and its associated economic byproducts, political parties have become completely reliant
on the ethnic factor in order to gain easy support to win the all or nothing elections18:
“The objective is therefore to secure control of the state in order „to eat,‟ and to ensure
that a co-(or allied) ethnic becomes president, this requiring the formation of alliances
and cross-ethnic coalitions. Politicians thus obtain power by using ethnic arithmetic and
clientage as mobilizing factors, the issue simply being how to win power in order to
access state resources.”19 The result has been political and ethnic struggle for control
over the state dominated by the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, and Kalenjin groups who occupy
the best agricultural land.20 The winning coalition in both parliamentary and presidential
elections has thus far been the one that was able to win support of the majority from the
four groups.21 As a consequence of these four dominant groups, the other 38 ethnic
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groups in Kenya have been drawn to ethnic conglomerations and coalitions especially
during elections in order to make sure their interests are protected.22 However, this
fixation with crafting coalitions does not end once the election is over: “Once in power,
the success and failure of the incumbent president, indeed the legitimacy and stability of
their governments, have largely been measured against their ability to cultivate and
maintain the support of a broad, multi-ethnic coalition of the four major groups.”23 It is
this constant scramble for support that plays into political parties drawing on the easiest
and most convenient means of support, ethnic groups.

The Emergence of Political Coalitions
Despite the emergence of political parties in the struggle for independence, the
period between 1969-1991 stands out as all five of the general elections held during this
period (1969, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1988) were one party only elections, that of KANU. 24
The events of the 1988 election with electoral fraud and resignations led to the birth of an
opposition alliance comprised of „young‟ professionals and intellectuals hoping to
mobilize the population for change.25 The pressure of foreign donors who decided to
withhold financial aid until Kenya implemented political reform also helped develop the
opposition. 26 These pressures piloted the KANU government to change the Constitution
of Kenyan ending one party rule in time for the 1992 elections. Yet despite this change,
President Moi and his political party KANU won electoral victories in the 1992 and 1997
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elections. It was finally after the 1997 elections when Moi only won by 40% of the vote,
that the opposition politicians realized the only way power would change hands would be
through alliances.27
The emergence of the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC), an alliance
made up of other political groups including Mwai Kibaki‟s National Alliance Party of
Kenya (NAK) and Raila Odinga‟s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP- made up of exKANU), finally pushed KANU out of power. With Mwai Kibaki winning 62% to Uhuru
Kenyatta‟s 31% (he was Moi‟s handpicked candidate), the December 27, 2002
presidential elections were the first time since colonial independence that a ruling party
was defeated and conceded power.28 However, once in power, the coalition members of
NARC began to fragment, the final push resulting during the November 21, 2005
constitutional referendum when LDP members returned to an alliance with KANU,
forming the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), to get the draft constitution rejected
by voters.29 After more political realignment during the 2005-2007 interregnum in which
the ODM unraveled creating two parties, the Orange Democratic Movement Party of
Kenya led by Raila Odinga and the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K) led
by Kalonzo Musyoka.30 Uhuru Kenyatta‟s KANU faction joined with the Party of
National Unity (PNU).31 This political shifting would lead to the 2007 election, pitting
Raila Odinga of ODM versus Kibaki of PNU (with Musyoka‟s ODM-K never becoming
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a major factor). To see a breakdown of multi-ethnic party coalitions from 1963-2007 see
Table 1 in Appendix IV.32
Party sponsorship is a pre-requisite in presidential, parliamentary, and civic
elections meaning that independent candidates are not recognized. As such, political
parties are the only vehicle for political representation. 33 These political alliances have
created an environment of political parties that lack any sort of permanent party structure
or membership. 34 As such, their ability to hold primaries, follow electoral rules and
regulations, and garner support based on factors other than ethnicity are very limited. By
their very nature, political parties in Kenya breed ethnicity.

Institutionalized Fear and Ethnicity
Violence following an election was not a new phenomenon of the 2007 elections.
In both 1992 and 1997 politicians used “local resentments against exclusion from land,
water rights, employment opportunities and access to other resources to provoke violence
against outsiders, not least because the presence of the latter within their constituencies
presented a numerical threat to their winning the forthcoming election.” 35 These
politicians used real issues but put an ethnic spin on them to garner support. Under
President Moi‟s twenty-four year reign, the use of ethnicity as a political tool became a
staple of retaining power. Largely characterized by institutionalized fear, political
opposition had little chance of formation against the powerful KANU, as Moi instigated
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state violence and intimidation to pressure people into doing his bidding. 36 He was even
able to change the Constitution, officially establishing Kenya as a de jure single-party
state. When opposition parties did finally form, he was still able to win as a result of
divided opposition. While both sides used political killings in order to intimidate the
public into voting a certain way, it was Moi‟s exploitation of ethnic tensions that set a
standard for the future. He played on the ever increasing fear of smaller ethnic groups
that they would be dominated by larger ethnic groups. The use of ethnicity, specifically
the violence used against certain ethnic groups during Moi‟s presidency, set a dangerous
precedent for the acceptability and role of forms of ethnic cleansing in political
competitions.
The post-independence construction of ethnically based patronage politics
centered around single-member electoral constituencies, the centralization of power
around the president, and the growth of armed militias associated with politicians and
political groups have all aided in the ethnic component of elections. 37 The predisposing
conditions of successive governments in Kenya‟s history ethnicizing political conflict
have perpetuated governments and politicians in continuing the pattern of brandishing
ethnicity as a political weapon whenever the votes may be close.

Section B- Kenya Against the Kikuyu
Ethnic Campaigning
Ethnicity reared its ugly head in the 2007 elections much like it had in the past.
Odinga and Kibaki each drew specific ethnic constituencies to their respective parties.
36
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Kibaki‟s support stemmed from the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru communities of Central
and central Eastern provinces.38 Odinga drew support from the Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin,
and some of the smaller ethnic communities. 39 Despite both parties being composed of
multiple ethnic groups, the Kriegler Report classified the PNU and the ODM in different
terms: “The PNU, though registered as a political party under Kenyan law as it then was,
was in reality an electoral alliance.” 40 The ODM on the other hand, though relatively
new, was a full-fledged political party and as such was more cohesively organized,
lending to less competition within the party allowing for a single candidate in each of the
provincial and civic contests.41 Despite these differences in the principles that brought
the ethnic groups together under one banner, each party heavily relied on ethnicity to gain
prominence and garner more support. While the campaign platforms of the two
presidential candidates did not directly promote any sort of ethnic favoritism, ethnicity
was the underlying factor in the stance each party took. Outwardly, Kibaki‟s campaign
focused on his past rather successful socio-economic record. Odinga in turn focused on
the idea of change especially in regards to fundamental political and socio-economic
reform as well as the devolution of state power.42 The underlying conditions of Kenya‟s
society revealed something deeper: “The 2007 election took place against the background
of a meteoric growth in the Kenyan population, deepening poverty, widening inequality
and youth under-employment.”43 These were the issues the two political parties had to
work with. One of Odinga‟s major platforms was majimbo upon which he believed
38
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would help reduce power of the executive, give greater political and fiscal authority
locally, and place economic development and responsibilities directly in local
communities. 44 Kibaki used this against Odinga claiming that majimbo was simply a
strategy to divide Kenya along ethno-regional lines. By focusing on the ethnic factor
instead of addressing the issues raised by Odinga, Kibaki diverted the focus from the real
issues at hand. Instead of focusing on these issues as a national problem, they both made
them an ethnic problem: “Confronted with acute poverty, inequalities and unemployment
in the context of ethnic polarization and the resurgence of ethno-nationalism, Kenya‟s
fragmented ethnic elite resorted to populism and manipulation of genuine economic
grievances and disaffection to win the vote of the poor.”45
Rhetoric played a crucial role during the campaign in appealing to the poor.
Slogans are often what determine who the poor or uneducated will support in elections
and are a key tool in piecing different groups together under a common banner. To
promote this “unity” among different ethnic groups, the ODM used the slogans “41
against 1” and “Kenya against the Kikuyu” throughout the period leading up to the 2007
election. 46 ODM campaigning focused on Kikuyu domination in the government and in
the economy (including banking and trade), portraying a picture of Kikuyu success as a
result of marginalizing other ethnic groups.47 Such campaigning, especially the blatant
use of directed slogans, helped construct a political conscience against the Kikuyu. The
negative connotation increased the already present hostilities between the ethnic groups.
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Such slogans gave the people an enemy on which to target their aggression when the
election did not go as they wanted: “resurgence of ethnic nationalism which underpinned
the campaign and voting during the elections and prepared the ground for the postelection violence.”48 Hate speech was a prominent feature of campaigning; however,
“Typical in Kenyan campaigns, both sides charged the other with using tribal appeals
while boasting of their own multi-ethnic credentials.”49 All three leading presidential
candidates (Kibaki, Odinga, and Musyoka) tried to establish their credibility as multiethnic by running with a vice-presidential candidate from the Luhya community. 50
The result of hate speech in the election was not just to rally members of a
political party around a common goal (keeping/getting power out of Kikuyu hands), but
was also a means of threatening people who lived outside their “indigenous” provinces. 51
Many of these people were threatened with eviction, in hopes of them moving, thus
making it easier to win the constituency. What furthered perpetuated hate speech in this
election was that the media took no steps to curb its use. A large result of this probably
stems from the fact that many of the FM stations were owned by politicians or received
funding, or bribes from them.52 Silent endorsement by the media to certain parties and
candidates was a common occurrence. 53 The increasing accessibility of information and
broadcasting meant ethnic hate speech could reach deeper into society than it ever had
before. It also meant that uncensored media at the local level could say and do what it
pleased: “Vernacular radio stations‟ coverage demonstrated a tendency to grant greater
48
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access to the parties and candidates with close links to the tribal and political affiliations
of their listeners.”54 This was exacerbated by new sources of information such as blogs
that were intensely tribal and incited negative ethnic feelings. 55 The ethnic rhetoric used
throughout the campaigning process brought ethnicity to the forefront of the public‟s
minds in regards to the upcoming election.
With ethnicity already dictating much of the campaigns, unsavory practices by
political parties including vote buying and selling using public resources, ballot stuffing,
and the use of intimidation and violence against political opposition, increasing an
already tense situation.56 As ethnic disputes and grievances over land and citizenship
became key issues during the campaign, escalating tensions that had been building since
colonial times finally exploded into the post-election violence and displacement.57 A
prominent feature of both ODM parliamentary and presidential campaigns was the
emphasis that only vote rigging would prevent ODM from taking power in the elections
(based on success during the 2005 referendum).58 This type of political strategy during
the campaign contributed to the violence after the election since the ODM‟s predictions
come true. The media/information blackout that followed after the announcement of the
presidential results accelerated the rash actions of the Kenyan public. 59 All the ethnic
campaigning of the elections finally was acted upon as ethnic groups attacked each other,
not knowing where else to place the blame.
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Code of Conduct:
Most of the political campaigning that occurred during the 2007 elections was in
blatant disregard of the Electoral Commission of Kenya‟s (ECK) code of conduct. 60 This
code of conduct had been derived from the Code of Conduct for Political Parties
Campaigning in Democratic Elections, published by the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 61 Its basic tenants for political party behavior
during elections include62:


Recognize the right and freedom of all other parties to campaign, and to
disseminate their political ideas and principles without fear



Use its good offices to ensure reasonable freedom of access to all potential voters



Ensure that none of its supporters are permitted to do anything that is prohibited



Organize and conduct its election campaign in a congenial and peaceful
atmosphere



Avoid using language that is inflammatory or threatens or incites violence

In addition the political parties violated internationally recognized norms regulating the
polling and counting processes along with the abuse of state resources for political
advantage63:


Co-operate with election officials to ensure peaceful and orderly polling, and
freedom of voters to exercise their franchise
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Not procure votes by forcible occupation of polling stations or through illegal
activities in polling stations



Ensure the safety and security of electoral officials before, during and after the
polls, and not interfere unjustifiably or in bad faith with the duties of election
officials.



Respect and co-operate with official or accredited election observers



Maintain and aid in maintaining the secrecy of the vote



Accept the outcome of an election that has been certified



In the event of grievance, submit any grievance only to the relevant dispute
settlement agency



Accept and comply with the final decisions of the dispute settlement agency



Not abuse a position of power, privilege or influence for political purpose by
offering a reward, threatening a penalty or harm by any other means



Not use official state, provincial, municipal, or other public resources for
campaign purposes



Not coerce or offer monetary or other kinds of inducements to persons to stand or
not stand as candidates

Political parties chose not to follow these rules/guidelines as the ECK did little to enforce
them. As such, political parties essentially had free rein to do and say what they pleased
despite the negative consequences to Kenyan society.
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Section C- Reform Options
Political parties are supposed to be the link between citizens and the political
elites.64 As a link, they are supposed to provide voters with the best sources of
information and to ultimately promote the common good. However, this has largely not
been the case in Africa where political parties have become “elite enterprises and
vehicles of competition and control over the masses.”65 Political parties have simply
become the means for attaining power. The constant volatility of political alliances and
coalitions means that political parties in Kenya are far from stable institutions and as
such, their motivations are centered on obtaining political authority. 66 This instability
means that it is hard for people to ever truly connect with a political party: “This fluidity
and high incidence of turnover may present well-known obstacles to voters gathering
information on relevant issues or personalities, and inhibit parties‟ incentives to cultivate
longer-lasting relationships with citizens, aggregate interests, and train new generations
of leaders.”67 As such, their manipulation of ethnicity during elections is nothing more
than a tool to garner support in order to achieve control. The consequences of these
actions are great. As one of the primary conduits of ethnic tensions, political parties and
especially their use of campaigning need to be reformed if the ethnic violence that
resulted from the 2007 elections is to be stopped from occurring after future elections.
The Political Parties Act (PPA) was created in an attempt to address some of the
major problems that were made apparent during the 2007 election process. It officially
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became operational on 1 July 2008. Under the Act, a party can be denied registration if
its membership is restricted to or only includes: “members of a particular ethnic, age,
tribal, racial, gender, regional, linguistic, corporatist, professional or religious group or if
the proposed party‟s structure or mode of operation is not national.” 68 This is designed to
not only decrease the number of political parties in Kenya, but to prohibit parties based
solely on ethnicity. The Act also addresses funding issues ensuring that a political
party‟s assets and funds are documented. 69 This will help with the corruption component
of money being spent on bribes for vote-buying or selling. In turn, the Act establishes a
Political Parties Fund that designates who gets money and how it can be used. 15% of
the Fund is distributed equally among all political parties, while 85% is allotted
proportionately to the total number of votes secured at the last election by each party‟s
candidates, and 5% is retained in order to pay for the administration costs of the Fund. 70
While this Act is a step in the right direction by trying to establish more equity between
political parties, it really does not address the underlying manipulation of ethnicity that
political parties rely on.
Although ethnicity lies deeper in society than simply political parties, it is their
actions and rhetoric that increase hostilities especially around elections. There are two
key areas where political parties in Kenya need to be monitored closer and reform needs
to take place in order to stop the promotion of ethnicity as an acceptable political tool: the
first is the messages that are being sent during the campaigning process, and the second is
increasing political party respect for the electoral institutions already in place.
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Inciting Division
As seen in the 2007 elections, campaign slogans and rhetoric during speeches
were central to the message candidates were sending out to the Kenyan people. The
ODM, understanding that divided opposition parties in the past had lead to unsuccessful
campaigns against the incumbent president, pushed the idea of all the ethnic groups
against the Kikuyu as its only shot at victory: “Politicians thus obtain power by using
ethnic arithmetic and clientage as mobilizing factors for the purpose of winning power to
access state resources.”71 This was a relatively easy venture based on the history of
building dogma about the Kikuyu domination: “Combined with the prominent role of the
Mount Kenya groups in the commanding heights of the Kenyan economy, the ability of
the Kikuyu to tap a vote-rich coalition has transformed the group into a perceptual
majority that has always been a target of fear and counter-mobilization by other
groups.”72 While changing these perceptions which are deeply rooted in Kenyan society,
the direct use of hate speech in slogans, speeches, party literature/advertisements, and
other political party instruments of information and communication can be changed. The
role the media plays in the role of hate speech in regards to elections and campaigning is
also a huge factor as that is how political parties are able to spread their hate messages to
their constituents.
One of the major concerns with monitoring the use of hate speech is that it will
violate not just freedom of speech but freedom of expression. The question becomes
when is the freedom of expression less important than promoting public safety? As such,
reform options for whom, what, and how to monitor hate speech will be challenging.
71
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Three apparent possible monitors of hate speech are: the media, civic institutions such as
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the ECK. Political parties have obviously
demonstrated their inability to monitor themselves and having them monitor each other
would only create more hostilities and situations for violence. As far as what exactly to
monitor, blatant ethnic hostility is easy to identity such as the slogan “Kenyans versus
Kikuyu.” It is the underlying jabs that will be harder to pin point and to say should be
stopped as the meaning could be construed in many different ways. Whoever is in charge
of monitoring political parties‟ use of hate speech will also need to create some sort of
guidelines as to what is appropriate use of ethnicity versus what can be considered hate
speech. The monitoring methodology will also be exceedingly challenging as the
expansion of media and information into every corner of Kenyan society will make it
difficult for any institution to supervise and check everything and everywhere.

Institutional Enforcement
Having an institution that can monitor the behavior of political parties will be
critical for any sort of reform to take place. The ECK is supposed to be the institution
that monitors electoral matters, but, as the 2007 elections proved, the ECK has not been
doing a very good job. While there are many mechanisms in place that allow the ECK to
pursue many infringements that political parties commit, the ECK has not enforced any
of these rules. For example, political parties are known to use a technique called
“zoning” to keep opposition candidates out of certain areas. 73 This violates the Electoral
Code of Conduct and can be prosecuted by the ECK if it were to bring it to the Attorney73
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General. This is only one example of the ethnically motivated political violence that
occurs during election periods. The use of intimidation in this manner definitely violates
the code of conduct; yet, the ECK did nothing. In order to enforce both the upstanding
electoral regulations regarding political party behavior and to implement new standards
on hate speech, there needs to be an institution that will actually follow through. There
are a few institutions that this responsibility could fall to: (1) the ECK if it were
strengthened and given enough authority to hold political parties accountable; (2) an
NGO that was committed to monitoring political party behavior especially during
elections; and finally, another government institution. The key is that whichever
institution is chosen, it needs to have the respect of the entire Kenyan community if it
will have any sort of legitimacy.

Section D- Recommendations
The legitimacy of political parties in the future needs to be dependent on their
ability to follow the rules set forth that eliminate the focus of ethnicity in elections. To
accomplish this, the rules for political parties need to be redefined and better mechanisms
established for developing and enforcing these rules. The key to reforming the behavior
of political parties is to change the incentives systems that currently dominate the
political scene:
Kenyan political institutions have been subject to the power of a highly
centralized and personalized presidency; that political parties have been
driven by the desire of politicians to acquire access to state resources and
patronage; that these parties have focused overwhelmingly upon the
necessity of winning; and that, as a result, elections in Kenya have become
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a „do or die‟ zero-sum exercise in which politicians have resorted both to
appeals to ethnicity and the use of violence against opponents. 74
Changing political incentives has been a challenging venture as they are extremely
entrenched in Kenyan society. It would be ideal for political parties to have some sort of
internal monitoring system: “Parties are meant to have robust internal debate and strong
internal structures.”75 Because this is not practical in a system that breaks the rules that
are in place, it is left to an outside institution to monitor political party behavior to
eliminate the negative use of ethnicity.

Inciting Division
“Sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me.”
Unfortunately, this saying does not apply to the verbal bashing of ethnic groups during
elections. Every time a politician, a political ad, or media group uses hate speech, ethnic
hostilities become more ingrained into society. The use of hate speech at party rallies via
text messages, emails, posters, and leaflets, all become “vehicles of excitement” that
often lead to ethnic violence. 76 With the increased role of the media and technology in
the 2007 elections for both direct campaigning and the release of information to the
public, it will be important for the mechanisms provided by Kenya‟s constitution and
legal framework to be utilized. The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) Act is
crucial to the campaigning process as it covers the public medium of communication. 77
Part of this act is to ensure there is a fair allocation of broadcasting hours between
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different political views.78 In consultation with the ECK, free air time will be allotted to
all registered political parties in the election. 79 These will be a key issues to monitor as
state run media tends to side with the incumbent or political party currently in power.
But more than that, this Act should include a clause that prohibits these major media
corporations from using hate speech or allowing political candidates to use hate speech
while on their programs or quotes in their publications. This is one aspect of who will
and how to monitor hate speech. In order to take some of the burden off the ECK to
monitor all of the media, the Media Council of Kenya (MCK) needs to be the institution
to oversee and enforce the media code of conduct that is relevant during elections. 80
Members of the media itself as well as people providing interviews or speeches on
television or through printed media need to be held to a standard that excludes the use of
rhetoric or actions that in anyway degrade or place blame on another ethnic group that
will incite undue resentment or hostility. 81
There also needs to be punishment for a political party candidate who uses hate
speech. While the MCK could provoke airtime or instigate a ban of the party for a period
of time, this runs the risk of corruption as parties could pay off the MCK for this not to
happen. If the ECK, however, was to enforce such punishment, it would have more
lasting authority. While the MCK should help with monitoring, the ECK should be the
institution imposing punishment. This will be discussed more in the next chapter. In the
future civic institutions should also play a role and have monitoring responsibilities.
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Presently, it might be too risky to have NGOs acting as “watchdogs” for the ECK as they
will likely have their own political and ethnic biases, but over time, as ethnicity becomes
less of a divisive factor civic institutions could not only take some of the burden off the
ECK, but would also be able to go deeper into society, looking at local media, blogs, and
other such items that might be difficult for the ECK to fully monitor. Hate speech needs
to be outlawed as a political campaign tool, much like other forms of ethnic violence
have been banned.

Institutional Enforcement
On top of initiating an anti-hate speech section into the KBC Act and into the
Electoral Code of Conduct, the ECK needs to be given greater capacity to deal with
blatant disregard for the electoral acts that have already established inappropriate political
party actions. Because the EKC is already an established organization that the public and
political parties have worked with, it will be easier to begin work with the ECK than to
start a brand new government institution or NGO. While the task will be challenging as
both the Kenyan public and political parties have little respect for the ECK, it would be
hard with any organization meant to harness in ethnic hate as: “The culture of impunity
maintained by all political players would certainly strain any law-enforcement
mechanisms that are established.”82 The mechanisms are already in place for the ECK to
take charge of elections, it just needs to have more authority and aptitude to do so. For
example, there are already rules against campaigning at polling centers. Increased
training for ECK members at different constituency polling centers can help prepare these
82

Republic of Kenya, 59.

60

workers for how to deal with political intimidation against certain ethnic groups and how
to manage and eliminate bribery for votes from occurring. By focusing on rules that are
already present, the ECK will just be enforcing what it legally has the right to do. These
small steps at polling centers can help end the use of violence and pressure by political
parties to influence the vote. Institutional enforcement of the rules and an application of
punishment is the only way that political parties will learn to modify their negative
behaviors.

Changing the Incentives System: Common Interests
The ultimate objective of intervening in practices of hate speech and aggression
against ethnic groups by political parties during elections is more than stopping the
violence, but to change the focus of elections from ethnic group interests to national
interests: “The danger of violence diminishes when politicians stress the common
interests shared by „insiders‟ and „outsiders.‟ ”83 Political parties are currently the main
instigators of the ideology of an „other‟ or „outsider‟ in Kenyan society. The ultimate
goal is for political parties to work together to end the cycle of ethnic violence that began
during colonial rule. But until such a time occurs and when corruption is not a
dominating factor, political parties need to be monitored and penalized for inciting ethnic
violence and hostilities. Part of this process is changing the attitude of the public towards
political parties and what they expect from politicians. Easy to say but hard to
implement, the people of Kenya need a model to guide the behavior of political actors.
The ECK, though in need of reform itself can prove to be a strong mechanism for
83
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instituting change within political parties in order to curb the use of ethnicity in
campaigning and other electoral processes of candidates. The final chapter addresses the
ECK and provides ways in which ECK reform will overflow into useful mechanisms to
help reform political parties, forcing them to shift focus from ethnic interest to civic
interests if they want political support.
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Chapter 3The Electoral Commission of Kenya
“While elections in Africa are hard to live with, it would be much worse to
live without them.”1
-Emmanuel K.

While Kenya may have been perceived as a “stable” country in Africa before the
2007 elections, the events that occurred after the elections transformed the world‟s
perception of Kenya: “The country highlights the ever-present risk of election disputes
degenerating into deadly conflicts in the context of weak institutions, elite fragmentation,
surging ethnic nationalism, authoritarian undertows, corruption, widening social
economic inequalities, historically embedded injustices, grinding poverty, debt overhang
and the spillover effects of climate change and global recession.”2 The question becomes
how to address these issues? The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) is the most
logical institution to be held responsible for addressing the issues that caused so much
destruction in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. The ECK has been assigned a role in
almost every aspect of the electoral process. It has already formed many committees
designated for different aspects of elections including public education and outreach and
administration of political parties. These and other committees can play a large role in
addressing ethnic issues that stem from these sources. The current voting system and the
ways in which political parties are allowed to function have already been shown to be in
need of reform. The ECK will only be an effective institution if it establishes
1
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institutional independence from the government, imposes its legal duties, and finds a
better way to resolve election disputes. Although the ECK is currently defunct since it
was disbanded by the parliament in 2008 and replaced with the Interim Independent
Electoral Commission of Kenya, it will need to be re-instituted after reform has been
agreed upon if the Kenyan electoral system has any chance of recovering its legitimacy in
the eyes of the Kenyan people.

Section A- ECK and the Constitution
As of the 2007 elections, the ECK was comprised of a chairman and 21 members,
the maximum allowed by the Constitution. The functions granted to the ECK set out in
Sections 42 and 42A of the Constitution of Kenya are as follows3:


To determine and review constituencies‟ boundaries and names at eight-to-ten
year intervals. The function similarly applies with respect to the local authorities.
Section 10 of the Local Government Act (Cap. 265) also gives power to the ECK
to divide local authorities into various electoral areas and prescribe their
boundaries and names.



To register voters and maintain and revise the voter register



To direct and supervise the presidential, parliamentary, and local government
elections

3



To promote free and fair elections



To promote voter education throughout Kenya

Republic of Kenya, 2008a. "Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections
Held in Kenya on the 27th December, 2007," 16.
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To carry out any other functions as may be prescribed by parliament

The National Assembly and Presidential Election Act expands on ECK functions stating
that it deal with4:


Matters related to registration of voters



Regulations relating to the protocols on election procedures



The code of conduct for campaigns (See previous chapter)



Procedures related to elections after a vacancy



Election expenses



And dispute resolution

In theory the ECK is operationally independent from governmental structures in that it
recruits its own staff all the way down to the grassroots level and does not depend on any
existing local administration structures. 5 The ECK deals solely in an administrative
capacity when dealing with complaints regarding elections, going only as far as ordering
recounts and retallies if requested by candidates or parties. 6 See Table 2 in Appendix V
for a breakdown of the institutional responsibilities for key electoral functions. The ECK
currently has no capacity to deal with issues of the media except for being consulted for
free airtime delegated to political parties. The Electoral Code of Conduct to which all
parties subscribe is essentially unenforceable by the ECK based on its current capacities.7
These restrictions on the ECK‟s ability to perform the tasks assigned to it have made it a
4
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relatively weak institution to date. The events of the 2007 elections have done nothing to
strengthen this.

Section B- The Election: Where Was the ECK?
The 2007 elections were different from previous elections in one very distinct
way: the violence that was triggered after the election was not about land, it was about
rigged voting. 8 Although there was perceived deception by the other political party,
what made the 2007 elections slightly different was that this time the blame was largely
placed on the perceptible collusion of the ECK with the incumbent party. Issues
surrounding the ECK were wide spread from mishandling the vote count, to scattered
voter registration, to the lack of ability to deal with the media and new technology, to
poor electoral dispute management.
Conceivably the biggest issue that resulted from the 2007 elections was the
resulting perception of the ECK: “neither political parties nor voters regard the Electoral
Commission and the wider state administrative system as neutral.” 9 This perceived loss
of neutrality and institutional independence undermined the foundations and actions of
the ECK. President Kibaki showed a blatant disregard for the institutional independence
of the ECK by replacing some of the members just days before the election, conceivably
a pre-planned approach to rig the elections if necessary. 10 While this was within his
power, the action looked very suspicious to the opposition party and outside observers.
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Kibaki placed 15 new members on the ECK in 2007 alone. 11 The damage done to the
legitimacy of the ECK during the elections will impact its ability to perform its functions
in elections to come and little has been done to restore its credibility in the intervening
years.
The ECK was also undermined in the performance of its duties before and after
the elections. One of the issues the ECK faced stemmed from the challenge to handle the
large increase in voters. The ECK had to double the number of voting stations to 27,555
and organized around 20,000 polling centers.12 This large increase in voting centers and
voter registration responsibility in and of itself inundated the ECK. The Report on the
Independent Review Commission (IREC) on the General Elections headed by Judge
Johann Kriegler of South Africa (also known as the Kriegler Commission and referred to
as such throughout the paper), found the ECK to be: “technically and administratively
incompetent, disproportionately expensive, and incapable of undertaking the fundamental
task of efficiently registering voters (for instance, an estimated 1.2 million deceased
voters were still on the electoral list).”13 The inclusion of numerous dead in the voter
register was far from the only numerical issue the ECK faced. Many constituencies
experienced an abnormal voter turnout. It is considered statistically abnormal to have a
voter turnout higher than 85% but in areas there was a voter turnout of over 100%.14 This
was a clear indication of ballot stuffing, denoting collusion between polling staff and
likely the members of political parties. The implications of such actions are in the
Kriegler Commission Report which stated the “irrefutable conclusion that the ECK was
11
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not able to manage counting, tallying and results announcement processes in such a way
that it secured the integrity of the electoral process at either the presidential or the
parliamentary level.”15 The integrity of the whole electoral process was jeopardized
when these results were made public. The ECK‟s contribution to the ethnic political
violence that resulted after the election results were announced can be seen in the manner
in which the disputed electoral results were handled. It has been widely agreed that the
ECK mishandled the vote counting, the ECK‟s chair of the Electoral Commission,
Samuel Kivuitu, even conceding that irregularities in voting had occurred. 16 However,
the larger issue of concern was Kivuitu‟s “damning admission” just after Kinaki was
declared president that “he had been subject to undue pressure, and that he could not say
with certainty that Kibaki had actually won the poll.” 17 This confession and poor vote
counting practices undermined the ECK‟s credibility.18
In addition, the ECK‟s attempts at voter education actually brought ethnicity to
the forefront of the voters‟ minds through its anti-violence and leadership campaigns.
Although these educational campaigns were intended to raise voter awareness about bad
election practices (such as intimidation for votes) and what a leader should be, the
campaigns did more harm than good by reinforcing old grievances between ethnic
groups.19 The material reinforced the idea that ethnicity was the main basis for choosing
a party/candidate. Ethnicity was also increasingly brought to attention with the increased
role of independent media in reporting on the elections and candidates.
15
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The media played a large role in informing the people of the obvious injustices
that had occurred. One of the biggest positives, and conversely negatives, stemmed from
the increased coverage of the election via FM radio. This allowed people to listen to
election coverage from a source other than the government and also allowed many people
to listen to broadcasts in their native languages. 20 The major negative was the increased
difficulty in controlling faulty information from reaching the public who were not always
equipped to distinguish fact from fiction. It also harked back to Rwanda in 1994 and the
use of the radio to incite violence. While the media can be a source of good information,
it can also be a source that incites hate. The ECK did try to prevent negative situations
by accrediting 2,964 local and international journalists to cover the 2007 elections. 21
These journalists were not only given ECK election kits, which included Media
Guidelines, but they were also briefed by the ECK. This training and orientation was
carried out by the Media Council of Kenya (MCK) in consultation with the United
Nations Development Programme‟s (UNDP) Media and Election Project. 22 The Media
Act of 2007 (established by the MCK) also sought to maintain the freedom of expression
as well as the freedom to receive ideas and information, while at the same time promoting
self-regulation of the media by emphasizing the code of conduct set out for journalists 23,
however, accreditation and training only meant so much. Two of the ECK‟s media
guidelines that were violated have direct correlation to the abuse of ethnicity. The first
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was that responsible media provides fair and impartial coverage to all contestants and the
second was resisting bribery. 24
The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) received a great deal of criticism
during the 2007 elections. Widely regarded as an arm of the government, the station was
accused of favoring the PNU.25 Its establishment, management, operations, and funding
were all constituted in the government. This biased source caused further outrage to the
Kenyan people with its, and solely its, documentation of the swearing-in of the president.
However, the KBC was not the only media outlet that showed a bias towards
certain candidates/parties/ethnic groups. The ECK could not monitor all sources of
information and even if it could have, the current freedom of expression laws would have
limited the amount of censorship the ECK could enforce. Opinion polls also played a
large part in promoting division between parties and ethnic groups as results were often
computed in a way to endorse the desired result. The biases of information through the
media and the manipulation of the opinion polls further created ethnic hostilities as voters
did not know what information to believe, thus, it was easy to fall back on the comfort
and trust found in one‟s own ethnic group and the familiarity of past behavior.
Adding to the ensuing chaos was the ECK‟s denial that it was the credible
mechanism to deal with electoral disputes, admonishing that the courts were/should be
responsible.26 The ODM, however, refused to take the issue to the courts, rightfully
pointing out that the courts were controlled by Kibaki as he had nominated six judges
(two to the Court of Appeal and four to the High Court) just a few days prior to the
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election date.27 The quick swearing-in of President Kibaki also promoted the eruption of
violence and highlighted fraudulent actions that had occurred in the election.

Section C- Reform Options
The Kriegler Report identified three basic problems that confront those organizing
elections: credibility, sustainability, and efficiency. 28 All three of these problems were
encountered by the ECK as a result of the 2007 elections. By addressing institutional
independence, management and implementation practices, the media, and electoral
disputes, the ECK can begin the long road to recovery. The following paragraphs delve
into these more deeply.

Institutional Independence
Currently, the members of the ECK are not only appointed by the President, but
the President is not required to consult with any other institutions or people while
considering nominees. 29 This must change. It is not the first time the issue of ECK
presidential appointment has been raised. Prior to the 1997 election, pressures from both
political parties and civil society helped create an alternative agreement known as the
Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG).30 In the IPPG, the parliamentary opposition
would provide the president with a list of nominees from which he would appoint ten to
the ECK.31 During Kibaki‟s presidency, as ECK members concluded their terms or died,
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he simply replaced them without reference to the IPPG accord.32 One available option is
to re-implement the IPPG accord and enforce it through the law and court systems.
Another option that would require working through the National Assembly would be the
creation of a committee of MPs represented proportionally by the party numbers in the
National Assembly who would appoint ECK members. This system would take the IPPG
accord and expand it by putting all of the duty in the hands of MPs. Ideally it would
promote the interests of all political parties in parliament, including smaller parties of the
opposition, allowing all parties to have a say. A final option would be to remove the
nomination of ECK completely away from the government by having an outside
organization appoint members. The ultimate goal of each of these options would be to
increase the independence of the ECK so that the public would not see it as a biased
institution.

Management and Implementation
Recommendations by the Kriegler Commission covered many issues regarding
management and application of electoral practices that fall under its current
Constitutional duties. These included:
Upgrading the competence of the ECK or completely replacing it, provide
for post-election audits of results (preferably by an independent body). It
also recommended the establishment of an appropriately empowered
dispute resolution court, a transition between a successful candidate‟s
election and swearing in, safe electronic storage of election materials and
results until a post-election audit has been conducted, inclusion of
measures for the representation of underrepresented groups (notably
women), and consideration of the merits of fixed terms of office for
president and parliament.33
32
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While there are many options for reform, some of the focus for the ECK in the future
needs to be on better training for its employees, especially temporary employees brought
in during elections. There also needs to be new mechanisms for holding these employees
accountable for their actions so they do not give in to practices of corruption such as
bribery, however, these will likely prove difficult and will take time. The ECK can,
however, immediately address some of the issues associated with voter registration, voter
education, and the enforcement of electoral codes of conduct, and in fact must address
them quickly in order to begin the process of repair with the public.
The ECK has previously used two main methods of registering voters, continuous
registration and drive registration. Continuous registration is needed as new people
become eligible to vote, people move, and others pass away. Drive registration typically
occurs right before elections in attempts to increase the number of voters by seeking out
people who have not yet registered. This is often done by political parties trying to gain
as much support as possible before the election. 1.7 million new people were registered
as voters during 2007 leading up to the elections 34 The problem with combining these
two methods in Kenya is that the ECK lacks the capacity (or will) to continuously update
Kenya‟s register to represent not only the influx of new people but the changes that have
occurred in the voter registry since the last election. This has opened the door for
corruption, allowing dead people to vote resulting in voter turnout over 100%. The ECK
has a few options to help rectify the current chaotic voter registry. It could scrap its
entire register and try to start by requiring people to register with their national ID cards.
It could use the downtime between elections to go through and combine its registries to
34
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ensure there is no overlap and remove people who are deceased or have moved. Or it can
continue using its current system with black books and high probability of corruption.
An increase in the number of voters can have both a positive and a negative side.
Increased participation by the citizens is positive; however, if voter registration is a target
for political corruption, then it is a negative, especially if it targets certain ethnic groups.
With the increased participation of Kenyan society in these past elections, the
ECK needs to embrace its role as a promoter of voter education to help limit ethnicity
from being the foundation upon which people vote. While the ECK attempted to do this
with its anti-violence and leadership campaigns to discourage negative election practices,
the reality was they brought many of these issues to the forefront of voters‟ minds.
Eliminating such campaigns is one option, leaving civil society to educate voters, but this
runs the risk of misinformation being distributed and it would be difficult to control any
ethnic appeal these campaigns might make to the voters. If the ECK continues these
types of campaigns, it will need to give examples that do not rely on ethnicity to portray
the point. For example, a campaign showing parents, teachers, school administrators, and
local and national government officials collaborating to develop new educational
programs regarding youth participation in elections. The challenge lies exactly in what
the principles behind elections are: “Elections are said to be free if the voters clearly
understand the election process and are able to exercise their political rights free of threat
from intimidation and in secrecy.” 35 The word intimidation automatically brings about
feelings around ethnicity since that has been the principle tool of violence and fear in the
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past. While the past cannot be changed, ethnicity does not have to be a tool of political
organizations in voter education.
Finally, ethnic hostilities have largely continued to be manifested in elections due
to the lack of ECK enforcement of its current mandates presented by the Electoral Code
of Conduct. The lack of mechanisms and resolve to enforce the code of conduct has
perpetuated ethnicity as a campaign tool of political parties who face little chance of
reprisal from the ECK. The ECK either needs to be given more resources and authority
to pursue abuse of the code of conduct by political parties and also the media (see below)
or a new institution or court system needs to be created. At this point in time, it would be
unreasonable to assume that political parties and other institutions will monitor
themselves and hold each other accountable since these abuses have become such
common practice and frankly, highly effective tools that politicians do not want to give
up.

The Media and Information
The increasing media component, evident in the 2007 elections, encouraging
ethnic division will continue to get worse as the internet, cell phones, and social networks
increase the quick and wide spread of information. As discussed in the previous chapter,
the ECK‟s ability to monitor and curb media abuses that propagate ethnic tensions needs
to be legally granted by Parliament. The media recommendations in this chapter focus on
the role and responsibilities of the ECK beyond its role in monitoring hate speech as
previously discussed.
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Disputed Elections
The lack of an institution to deal with the disputed election results was a
significant factor that lead to the mass post-election violence. One of the key areas of
electoral reform needs to be defining who is in charge of disputed elections from the
primary level all the way to the national level. This is not an area that can be left
unresolved. If it is the ECK‟s responsibility, then new mechanisms to deal with these
issues quickly and impartially need to be established. If public trust in the ECK is too
small at the moment to have it resolve disputes, then some kind of judicial court system
needs to be created to deal with electoral disputes.
Mexico and South Africa provide two different examples for different approaches
to handling electoral disputes. Mexico has established its own electoral tribunal that has
exclusive jurisdiction in relation to elections. 36 One of the downsides of this approach is
that establishing a separate tribunal is extremely costly as it requires a whole new set of
administrative costs as opposed to if it worked within already established judicial or
electoral structures. South Africa has taken a slightly different approach, establishing a
special electoral court that works within its judicial system. The court is comprised of
three senior members of the judiciary who do their routine work but are on standby in
case an urgent electoral dispute arises.37 The concern with this approach for Kenya is
that the public is very leery of its judicial system which is largely seen to be controlled by
the president, thereby being perceived as a biased institution. Whatever mechanism is
established, it needs to ensure ethnic prejudices are absent so that it does not intensify
hostilities.
36
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Section D- Recommendation
With the ever increasing importance of elections in Kenya, it is critical to have an
institution that focuses specifically on elections, that is separate from other governmental
institutions and is seen as a separate entity from the government in the sense that the
people know it is ultimately promoting and keeping their best interests in mind. The
promotion of truth and accuracy should be the ECK‟s top priorities. Ultimately success
of the ECK lies in its ability to perform its functions according to these criteria 38:


How transparent all is processes are



How simple and accessible its procedures and service are to all



How much it respects the principles of equity as a measure of ensuring free and
fair elections



How well it asserts its independence



How well prepared it is for all its activities



How well it anticipates and deals with any electoral disputes and hitches



How well it keeps learning from its experiences for the improvement of its
processes



How well it can enforce or ensure enforcement of its decisions and processes

Each of these will help shift the focus from any ethnic or biased view of the ECK. From
these observations, the following recommendations will be examined in regards to ECK
reform: increased institutional independence of the ECK, improving current management
practices already delegated to the ECK, new laws regarding the ECK‟s control and input
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on media and technology, and finally, to better define the role of the ECK in election
disputes and create new mechanisms to deal with electoral disputes post-election.

Institutional Independence
If the people are ever going to put their trust in the ECK, it needs to gain
institutional independence from not only the government (specifically the president), but
also from the pressures of other political institutions. This process should begin with
repealing the President‟s ability to appoint the chairman and other commissioners of the
ECK. There needs to be distance between powers of the president and the mechanisms
that determine who will be the next president. By allowing the president to appoint
members to the ECK, it is opening up the temptation for an already high existence of
corruption to become even greater. This corruption impedes justice by increasing the
likelihood that the ECK consists of members of the president‟s political party, which
means that the president is likely appointing people he/she feels will support him no
matter what, which means it is probably a member of the president‟s own ethnic group.
This inbreeding will lead the public to doubt the ECK as a fair institution, thus
undermining any of the results it produces. While it would be ideal for ECK members to
be appointed by a non-governmental institution that does not have any sort of political
aspirations, such an institution does not exist and would be difficult to create, maintain,
and monitor. The next best option would be to have ECK members appointed by MPs
based on a committee that is represented proportionally by the party numbers in the
National Assembly. This would provide for an institution that is already established and
already involved in the ECK (as it established laws for the role and conduct of the ECK)
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to monitor its appointees in case of misconduct. Proportional representation would also
help ensure that member of the ECK represented all/or at least a majority of political
interests, thereby increasing equity, fairness, and hopefully trust in the ECK. These
attributes would in turn limit corruption, facilitating decreasing tensions between ethnic
groups; however, this would be rather complex to coordinate. Until the National
Assembly is more representational of Kenya‟s populace, the best course of action for the
time being would be to re-implement the IPPG accord, which was established before the
1997 elections, and put it into law so it could be enforced. The IREC‟s most recent
recommendation was that only three to nine Commissioners would be appointed by the
President and approved by Parliament.39 It has limited the number of appointees as a
result of what it perceives to be as an overly large commission; however, the following
recommendations for expanding the ECK‟s role in elections would necessitate a large
institution. Since elections are the cornerstone for nation-building, and the ECK is the
institute that monitors these elections, it needs to be given the capacity to act effectively.
As both political parties and civil society promoted the IPPG in 1997, public acceptance
of this would likely be high, helping establish more legitimacy for the ECK.
In addition, another factor that needs to be evaluated in consideration of appointed
members is the length of their term and status in the ECK. Renewable five year terms are
worthy of continuation as it allows members to serve on the ECK for a full election cycle
to experience the entire process and also expertise to develop which will help contribute
to reform of the ECK over time. The timing of the introduction of new members,
however, should be changed. New members should be brought in between elections not
39
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right before or after them. Training new members should occur during a period that is
not overly stressful or with high political activity. Learning while on the job is necessary
but not in a period of such high tensions when mistakes can be very costly. This would
also allow MPs to settle into their new terms before making appointment decisions. The
practice of tenure also needs re-evaluation as the current practices aimed at establishing
justice are missing the mark since removal is essentially impossible. 40 Like MPs or any
other institution, members of the ECK need to be held responsible for their actions. If a
member accepts bribe money or slanders an ethnic group, they need to be held
accountable for their actions and removed so that trust in the ECK by the public is not
lost. This would need to be provided for in a legal framework.
Even if ECK members are not appointed by the president, it will never truly be an
independent institution until it is no longer financially dependent on the government. 41
Financial dependence, especially through the president, can lead to control of the ECK by
the president, who may force the ECK to comply with its donors‟ demands. One way to
help with this situation would be to have political parties finance the ECK, each
contributing the same amount of money. This would ensure that all political parties
would be interested in the ECK running efficiently and fairly; however, this raises an
issue for smaller parties or parties that do not have the financial means to contribute.
Because of this, it might be beneficial for the time being that foreign governments/aid
donors fund the ECK until a better system of taxation might be applied that would be
designated for the ECK without conditions or strings attached.42 At any rate, the funding
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for the ECK should not be controlled by one person or constituency in the government
that could pressure members to act in an unscrupulous manner. While this is a function
the government should cover the expenses for, getting other parties involved initially
might help increase its legitimacy until a time comes when the government does not use
money to apply pressure on these institutions. ECK institutional independence means
that its members are concerned with the wellbeing of all members of society and thus
pursue actions that will enhance the welfare of the people. By enhancing the
independence of the ECK, it will limit accusations from political parties that the
institution is biased, and thus supporting certain ethnic groups while suppressing others.
It will also begin the process of decreasing the magnitude of presidential powers, helping
Kenya to shift away from one person domination who is often ethnically motivated.

Management and Implementation
By improving the day to day processes of voter registration, voter education and
outreach, and enforcing electoral codes of conduct, the ECK can instigate change in the
electoral process away from ethnicity. Ethnic hostilities have become so embedded in
Kenyan society that it will take work from the most basic principles of the electoral
system to begin to create change in the whole system.
The simple act of voter registration is one area where the ECK can show that
someone‟s ethnicity has no bearing. Everyone should and has the right to vote. The
present chaos of the voter registry however makes this challenging. Between all the
records from continuous registration and drive registration, it is difficult for the ECK to
say that certain ethnic groups are not overly represented in the registrar. There needs to
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be an overhaul of the system despite the costs associated with such an action. In order to
get a hold on the voter registration, which has become a prime source of corruption by
political parties (these political candidates using votes to promote ethnic hatreds), an
accurate resemblance of the voter population needs to be recorded. One place to start this
process would be using other national population databases to get information regarding
the Kenyan population. For example, the national ID card has been proposed as a way
not only to determine eligibility for voting, but to establish a method of verification when
voting. The ECK can start by cross checking its current registry with a listing from the
national database that issued the ID cards. The voting registers from all the
constituencies need to be compiled into one list that the ECK can reference. While this is
a huge undertaking, perhaps some of the temporary workers hired for elections could be
hired to begin this process. That would provide jobs and help increase accountability of
these workers (obviously there would need to be a background check of the workers to
try and determine their trustworthiness). By having these people work in groups that
represent a plethora of political parties, they would hold each other accountable to make
sure the data is not manipulated. Having these different groups work together for the
common good is just one step in promoting civic nationalism. Verification of the
information acquired by the voter would need to occur, but the key for the ECK will be to
go to the voters to get information instead of having voters come to the ECK. If the ECK
shows an effort to obtain accurate information, without putting undue pressure or burden
on voters, it will help initiate a foundation of trust and hopefully respect. An accurate
voter registry will help solidify the results that the ECK posts enhancing its credibility in
the eyes of the voters which will enable it to work with voters in other areas. It is in these
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other areas that the ECK can start to shift voter focus away from ethnicity as the
determinate of elections.
While the ECK has previously focused on voter education right before elections,
there is a great deal that it can do in the downtime between elections. Civil society has
increasingly taken an interest in educating voters with the rise of NGOs. 43 Because the
ECK cannot handle voter education by itself, it would be important that it provide
training for and accredit these civil organizations so that voters are not only getting
accurate information but they also know who they can get trustworthy information from.
The campaigns these organizations promote need to focus not only on the importance of
voting or of presenting the issues to the people, but they need to do so in a way that
emphasizes the importance of voting for community interests. 44 The key then is to
connect these interests to national interests. The whole process needs to be seen as
something that is good for everyone. This process could commence by teaching voting
principles in primary and secondary schools. 45 Teaching the history of elections and the
negative role that ethnicity played in the deaths and violence that occurred as a result to
younger generations would hopefully take away the emphasis of ethnicity in elections in
the future. By working with civil society, schools, and directly with people, the ECK
could begin to build bridges with Kenyan society to increase its legitimacy and to begin
the process of eliminating ethnicity from elections.
Through many acts, including the Electoral Code of Conduct and the Election
Offences Act, the ECK already has mechanisms in place that state what appropriate
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behavior is during elections. Hate speech and practices regarding ethnic discrimination
are clearly in violation of these acts. However despite the ECK‟s allowance to pursue
courses of action against violators by having the Attorney-General prosecute them, the
offences committed during the election went relatively unpunished. 46 By not stopping
these practices, the ECK is only letting ethnic hatred practices to continue to prevail in
elections. As such, the ECK needs to begin to enforce the acts that protect society from
not only direct hate speech by political parties and the media but actions that prompt
ethnic violence. Part of the ECK‟s staff needs to be focused and trained on dealing with
the electoral code of conduct. This sector of the ECK should be the first step in
penalizing parties that violate ethics of the electoral process. What these penalties would
be needs to further research and would depend on the severity and situation, but the
message that needs to be sent out is that any practices that purposefully put down,
intimidate, or harass an ethnic group will not be tolerated. If punishment at the level of
the ECK does not work then the next step would be sending the violating parties to the
electoral disputes court (see section Electoral Disputes below). Without a system that
penalizes political parties, the media, and other actors in authority positions for wielding
ethnicity as a power tool, then the system will only perpetuate the cycle. The ECK can
become one of the many institutions it will take to curb the use of ethnicity in politics in
Kenya.
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The Media and Information
The ECK‟s increased involvement in the media and the dissemination of electoral
information will be a key component in prosecuting parties that violate electoral codes of
conduct. The 2007 elections saw the emergence of the information age in the election
process as communication to the electorate through technology and the increased
participation of youth resulted in information flooding.47 As Peter Kagwanja and Roger
Southall quoted: “Never before had Kenyan voters been privy to so much election-related
information, and never had it been harder to sort facts from fiction.”48 While it would be
impossible for the ECK to moderate all forms of media and technology, the first step to
address these issues will be to form a close partnership with the MCK and the KBC. By
increasing the number and scope of institutions that can monitor the abuse of ethnicity in
the media, the ECK can work on its ability to enforce media abuse in elections. The
Kenya Broadcasting Corporation Act, which holds there should be an equal allocation of
expression of different political views in the media, should be amended so the ECK has
the power to compel KBC to act in accordance with the law regarding elections. The
KBC has a history of unfair allocation. 49 By working through legitimate mechanisms that
give power to the ECK to enforce biased media practices, the KBC would have to comply
if it wants public opinion to change. Since the KBC is a huge media outlet in Kenya, the
ability of the ECK to work with it as opposed to against it eventually would help the ECK
promote fair election practices.
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In coordination with the KBC and MCK, the ECK could also increase its
accreditation of sources of information from newspapers to organizations, helping voters
to distinguish between reliable and potentially unreliable sources of information. This
would entail the ECK addressing corruption that may be present in such sources such as a
government run newspaper or media broadcasting center. Such sources of information
would need to be taken with a grain of salt and voters would need to be aware of this
potential bias.50 In order to reach people of all backgrounds and groups, part of the
accreditation process should be accrediting a wide range of journalists and media
personnel who speak a plethora of languages to cover as many regions of Kenya as
possible. This might extend to the ECK providing a translation service or having the
MCK provide translation services during elections in order to provide people from all
over with accurate information. Lists of accredited journalists and translators would need
to be circulated throughout Kenya with an ECK seal of acknowledgment and these
members would need to have credentials when out in the field so their authenticity could
be verified easily by the people. This would obviously be a huge undertaking, but the
ECK has already shown its willingness to accredit and train media during the past
elections. By working with the MCK, the ECK could increase its efficiency and
effectiveness in this venture by limiting discrimination practices in providing and
producing information regarding elections.
The publication of information throughout the 2007 elections caused much of the
ethnic violence that occurred. The ECK should establish guidelines for verifying data
before it is published in any capacity, including advertisements, polling results, and
50
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especially election results.51 The elections saw an increase in the use of opinion polls as
the independent polling industry grew.52 Based on politician and public use and reliance
on opinion polls leading up to the election, the ECK needs to monitor polling companies
to ensure the data is accurate and reliable. This could help voters make an informed
decision, knowing that polls are not being manipulated. The ECK can do this, for
example, by setting standards for sampling techniques to make sure that practices are
consistent. This should help limit extreme variance in polls which has been argued to
have contributed to political instability. 53 Like journalists and other media sources, the
ECK can accredit polling agencies that follow the standards set by the ECK so the public
can know it is viewing respectable information. Accreditation of any sort from media
outlets to journalists to polling companies should be approached with caution by the ECK
as bribery and corruption could easily come into play. With a history of political parties
and candidates paying off people for votes, it would be easy for such groups to buy off
members of the ECK in order to get accreditation. While there is no quick fix for this
issue, it is something for the ECK to be aware of as it expands it role of monitoring and
verifying other organizations involved in the electoral process to limit ethnic abuses.

Disputed Elections
The major reason people resorted to violence after the election results were
revealed was because they lacked a legitimate institution to bring their quarrel to. The
51
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ECK needs to be the first stop in dealing with any electoral disputes. One of the ways to
avoid some of these disputes is to be very cautious in its publication of election results.
Using concepts such as “partial” or “progressive” results from different constituencies
can help limit disputes by not announcing results and then changing the results later.54
This would have helped with the 2007 elections, but there still would have been a dispute
as the issues went deeper than simply how results were given. When these matters
cannot be resolved by the ECK or if matters involve the ECK, then per the
recommendation of the IREC, it would be beneficial for a new law to establish an
Electoral Dispute Resolutions Court to handle appeal matters.55 Such a court would be
very beneficial especially if the dispute was time sensitive. One of the main issues this
court would handle would be post-election disputes including election petitions. These
petitions would need to be filed in a timely manner and any current rules and regulations
regarding procedures of election petitions would need to be repealed or replaced. The
IREC made a recommendation of six months as plenty of time to file a petition postelection. 56 The financial implications of this action are obvious, but such an established
system is necessary in order to deal with disputes in an orderly and productive fashion
rather than resorting to violence as occurred after the 2007 elections when the ECK
refused to take responsibility for dealing with contention. If Kenya were to take the
South African route, of an electoral court within the judicial system, the question would
become which justices would be chosen to serve? One of the main arguments for having
Kenyan‟s electoral court be separate from the judiciary is that: “in a highly politicized
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society such as Kenya, where judicial impartiality has already been doubted, the judiciary
should not be unnecessarily exposed to the risk of being politicized, or being seen to be
politicized, by its involvement in political disputes.”57 There is also the issue that by
pushing electoral dispute to the Judiciary, the ECK would only be moving justice farther
away from the parties involved.58 As such, it is in the best interest of the ECK to
establish its own electoral disputes court to deal with not only election result disputes but
abuses of electoral codes of conduct that cannot be addressed at lower levels of the ECK.
The “justices” appointed to this court could come from members of the ECK who have
experience with law in some capacity or they could be appointed by MPs. There is even
the option of having the public vote for the justices on the national ballot in the future.
For the time being, it might be simplest to have the Interim Independent ECK appoint
people to the court. With the creation of this court would come a great deal of
responsibility as it would be imperative to not lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the people
because once it did it would be very hard to restore, especially based on how the ECK
handled the disputes that resulted from the 2007 elections. With the new institution
starting fresh, it would be crucial that it was viewed as independent of the government,
political parties, and any particular ethnic group. The successful creation and
implementation of a new electoral dispute court would help augment the ECK‟s
neutrality and ability to handle elections in a fair way that promotes equality amongst all
ethnic groups.
In summary, it is crucial for the ECK to have the trust of the various stakeholders
in Kenyan society. Its reform would define how people perceive elections in the future.
57
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If the ECK is seen as a fair and unbiased institution, the threat of violence in closely
contested debates would diminish substantially as there would be little question about the
accuracy of the results. In this simple way an independent ECK could help mitigate
ethnic hostilities.
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Conclusion
While it may be considered a small step, addressing flaws in the electoral process
provides a place to begin shifting the Kenyan culture away from ethnic centric
institutions and practices to those with a unified, national focus. Simply establishing
rules does not mean they will be followed (case in point, political parties following the
Electoral Code of Conduct). However, as can be seen throughout Northern Africa, the
Middle East, and most recently in Uganda, discontent can breed a change movement.
The discontent with the procedures and results of the 2007 elections provides a
foundation for electoral reform to take hold in Kenya. In this concluding chapter, the
recommendations given in each of the core chapters will be presented as options that can
immediately be implemented to address the role of ethnicity in political competition, then
an examination of some of the challenges facing electoral reform will be addressed, and
finally, some other future areas of reform will be discussed.
Changing incentives from ethnic to civic in political competition begins with
changing the structures that allow ethnicity to thrive. As has been argued, changing the
current voting system, the way political parties maneuver ethnicity, and the role of the
ECK in elections are all ways that ethnicity in Kenyan society can be addressed. The
recommendations presented throughout this thesis were proposed because they can be
implemented in the short term. With the current FPTP system of voting, the losers will
always challenge the results in elections since a majority of the vote is not required to
win, resulting in doubt of who the Kenyan people actually want to represent them. The
closed list PR system promotes inclusivity of all groups and relies on a majority principle
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to determine results. If the current eight provinces are used in this system, there will be
no need to draw new boundaries making its implementation immediate.
If political parties are allowed to continue to use ethnicity as a political weapon in
elections, they will continue to undermine elections as a legitimate institution: “Elections
involve high stakes. Their credibility is tied to national stability, and the winning and
losing of elections is tied to political party power.”1 While it will take time to develop
both the ECK and MCKs‟ abilities to monitor hate speech, the process can begin
promptly by enhancing the laws that have already been established in the Electoral Code
of Conduct. By working with mechanisms already in place, monitoring hate speech by
outlawing obvious abuses such as “Kenyans versus Kikuyu” can be started now before
the next elections. Beyond the promotion of ethnic division surrounding elections and
the campaigning process, the basic structure of political parties creates concern for the
future. As most political parties are created from coalitions of ethnic groups prior to
elections, one of the dangers is that a loss may be perceived by an ethnic group as a result
of desertion by an ally within the coalition “ethnic groups that had „betrayed‟ them
should be taught a lesson.”2 If members of the same political party are willing to turn on
each other, the animosity towards opposition ethnic groups would only intensify the
hostilities. By developing rules and regulations for political parties and campaigning that
remove the emphasis from ethnic groups which incite division, reform begins the process
of political parties finding common interests to garner support that endorse civic interests.
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Changing the basic structure of political parties will take a little more time to develop but
steps toward this end can begin now.
Finally, if the ECK is left unreformed it is very likely that the 2012 elections will
produce similar results to that of 2007. The ECK needs to take control of elections
instead of elections taking control of the ECK. The current instability of this institution
to manage and organize elections contributes to the de-legitimization of elections as an
institution. It is the current unpredictability of elections that often leads Kenyans to join
political parties based on ethnicity as way to protect their interests and maintain security.
Stabilizing the ECK by reform and increasing its power will facilitate the development of
an electoral system based on rules that can help limit the role of ethnicity in political
competition. The overarching electoral reform that needs to occur is changing the current
electoral incentives that have lead to political mobilization around ethnic groups. Both
the salience of ethnicity as a political resource and the utility of resorting to violence need
to be addressed. 3 Many of the roles of the ECK are already defined on paper; therefore,
the ECK can begin to actually carry out these roles immediately. With the structure
already in place, the steps for reform simply require courage and willingness to assume
the authority already granted.
When considering possible electoral reform in Kenya, it is crucial to remember
political institutions are only part of the problem. The role of culture in addressing
ethnicity as a political tool is a key component with the issues deeply embedded in
history. While common citizens are often victimized in electoral violence, it is important
3
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to recognize they are not guiltless. The IREC emphasizes that the violence before and
after the 2007 elections was not merely a result of the ECK, electoral institutions, or
political leaders; the Kenyan people were just as implicit as they all engaged in:


Vote-buying and selling



Unapologetic use of public resources for campaigns



Participation by public servants in campaign activities of certain camps



Ballot-stuffing



Organizing marauding gangs and bully-boys to „zone‟ regions and electoral areas
and intimidate opponents



Using and cheering and uploading hate speech and ethnic sentiments



Demonizing opponents and presidential candidates of opponent camps



Using sexist tactics and violence to keep women out of the race.4

This is largely a result of the zero-sum mentality which has become associated with
elections. The promotion of ethnicity is currently a key component in political strategy
and there needs to a shift towards “inter-ethnic integration, pluralism, tolerance, and
mutuality.”5 However, this is not an easy task:
Even as we recommend constitutional and legislative changes, it is
important that Kenyans honestly assess all the activates relating to the
2007 general elections so as to distinguish those that can be attributed to
anomalies, failures and malpractices traceable to gaps or provisions in the
Constitution and laws of Kenya from those that can be attributed to a bad
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culture encompassing impunity, disrespect for the rule of law and
institutional incompetence.6
The Kenyan electoral system is built upon ethnic foundations that have been embraced at
all levels of society resulting in deadly consequences. It is this infiltration of ethnic
mindedness that will challenge some of the changes electoral reform creates.
The likelihood of electoral reform faces many challenges already and is severely
limited by the current power sharing government. The power sharing government
represents many dangers in and of itself:
The resulting power-sharing government, enforced upon the ODM by
Kibaki‟s intransigence, while preferable to the possible alternative of a
collapse of the state into civil warfare, has set a dangerous precedent for
the rest of Africa. It has sent out the message that powerful losing parties
need only to refuse to accept electoral outcomes by resorting to
unconstitutional and violent action to ensure that the winning opposition is
required to share power. Power sharing may be an attractive alternative to
violence, but may encourage incumbent regimes to rely on coercion to
resist the will of the people and the transfer of power to electoral winners. 7
This power sharing arrangement is a temporary solution that needs to be remedied as
quickly as possible or else instability in the next elections is likely to result in the same
conflict. Electoral reform can potentially provide a way of deterring a power-sharing
government from resulting again but the likelihood is small: “With Kibaki, Odinga, and
Musyoka all in government, the absence of an opposition party undermines reform
efforts.”8 This is evidenced in the fact that the coalition government has yet to even
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institute a new ECK. 9 With internal motivation for electoral reform lacking, it may be up
to some external pressure to get change started.
Historically, motivating governments to focus on electoral reform has been
challenging. One of the major problems of promoting electoral reform over other areas of
reform is the lack of desire to address such issues. Electoral reform does not receive the
attention it should because it is not perceived as a significant change agent nor does it
garner much press. One will not become a hero by promoting electoral reform.
Internally there is little appeal and externally there is even less as “major actors (notably
the African Union and Western governments) engaged in addressing the Kenyan crisis
have [neither] the desire or stomach to pursue a far-reaching agenda.”10 Incentives need
to show the current electoral system is a threat to the political class and that change will
be beneficial. 11 Such a push for reform might only come if there is a repeat of the
violence that was seen in 2007 in the next election in 2012. 12 This could threaten the
integrity of the country enough to encourage the political classes to make a change.
However, electoral reform now, before the next elections, can stop unnecessary violence
from even occurring. What Kenya needs is a reason to make a change and embrace
reform at this moment. That reason should come from an understanding that other areas
of reform, such as cultural matters, will take a long time to implement while electoral
reform can begin to limit the negative role of ethnicity now.
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Other areas of Kenyan society that foster ethnic divisions should be addressed as
reforming these areas will be key support to and build upon electoral reform: “it would be
absurd to think that electoral reform alone would address the ills of an over-powerful
presidency, curb extra-state violence, restore the integrity of state institutions, re-orient
political parties away from ethnic clientilism and, at the very least, somewhat reduce
corruption. Electoral reform could only be one step along a tortuous journey.” 13 Some of
the key areas that need to be reformed stem from Kenya‟s unique colonial history, and
thus there is no generic cultural reform that can be applied that will eliminate the negative
uses of ethnicity. The issue of land and control has plagued Kenya for too long: “the land
issue constitutes the major structural factor underlying ethnically driven electoral and
political violence in Kenya.”14 This underlying dynamic has greatly increased ethnic
divisions in Kenya and will continue to play a role unless addressed in a context that
promotes the use of land as beneficial to all. Reform at the educational level alongside
cultural organizations will also need to occur in order to completely erase the ethnic focus
surrounding Kenyan society. These programs should focus on social cohesion where
ethnic identities and cultural diversities are appreciated but do not dominate every aspect
of life.15 The role of NGOs as well as churches will need to be relied on to implement
change alongside the Kenya government.16 All of these areas are in need of further
research.
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While it is easy to say that all Kenya needs is “change” to halt the abuses of
ethnicity in political competitions, change comes with difficulty. Electoral reform is
simply a stepping stone for the substantial change that needs to take place in regards to
Kenyan views on ethnicity: “Elections must ultimately be a nation-building exercise,
rather than a divisive one. Since elections provide a means by which political power can
change hands peacefully, they need to be managed in such a way as to deliver not only an
arena for peaceful political contest but also to ensure general acceptance of outcomes and
stability for other nation-building activities.”17 Elections provide a visible venue for the
promotion of civic nationalism to begin. With the 2012 elections just around the corner,
if the issues surrounding electoral reform are not addressed and the power-sharing
arrangement continues to accomplish little, there will be a repeat of the 2007 election
complete with violence, death, further division, and significant disruption to the Kenyan
economy.
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APPENDIX I

The eight Kenyan provinces: 1) Central, 2) Coast, 3) Eastern, 4) Nairobi, 5) North
Eastern, 6) Nyanza, 7) Rift Valley, and 8) Western.

Webster‟s Online Dictionary, “Kenya,” http://www.websters-onlinedictionary.org/definitions/Kenya?cx=partner-pub-0939450753529744%3Av0qd01tdlq&cof=FORID%3A9&ie=UTF-8&q=Kenya&sa=Search#906 (accessed April 19,
2011).
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APPENDIX II
Map of the Kenyan Districts: This does not represent the constituencies for voting. The
constituencies are currently in flux so a map would prove inaccurate. However, it does
show the discrepancy in size of the districts.

FAO Corporate Document Repository,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/t0737e/T0737E05.htm (accessed April 19, 2011).
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APPENDIX III
Breakdown of Kenyan provinces by ethnic group.

BBC News “Kenya diplomatic push for peace.”
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7167363.stm> (accessed April 19, 2011).
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APPENDIX IV

Kagwanja, Peter and Roger Southall. "Introduction: Kenya - A Democracy in Retreat?"
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 3 (07, 2009): 267.
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APPENDIX V
Table 2.

Republic of Kenya, 2008a. "Report of the Independent Review Commission on the
General Elections Held in Kenya on the 27th December, 2007."
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/FinalReport_consolidated.pdf (accessed April 19,
2011).
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APPENDIX VI
Table 3.

Gibson, Clark C. and James D. Long. "The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in
Kenya, December 2007." Electoral Studies 28, no. 3 (9, 2009): 499.
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